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THE ARKANSAS REMEDY FOR EMPLOYER RETALIATION
AGAINST WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMANTS
J. Thomas Sullivan*
Workers who suffer discharge or other forms of retaliation as
a result of filing workers' compensation claims have been extended
protection from this discrimination in many jurisdictions. The rec-
ognition of a remedy for wrongful discharge or other employer
retaliation has proceeded on a number of diverging paths in Arkansas
over the past decade. In 1993, the General Assembly sought to
expressly annul decisions of the state supreme court recognizing a
civil remedy in contract for retaliation. This article examines both
the civil remedies and the administrative remedy created by the
General Assembly to supplant them. The author argues that Arkansas
law fails to adequately protect workers' compensation claimants from
retaliatory discharge or other employer discrimination. Part I ex-
amines the administrative remedy created by Act 796 of the 79th
General Assembly. Part II explores the contractual remedy predicated
on the Arkansas Supreme Court's recognition of public policy-based
claims for wrongful discharge in its decision in Sterling Drug v.
Oxford. Part III examines the development of tort remedies, par-
ticularly the tort of outrage, as an alternative approach for recovery
in light of the recent history of outrage and the peculiar facts which
surround retaliatory discharge of workers' compensation claimants.
The author also argues that the General Assembly's attempt to
reaffirm the doctrine of employment at will by annulling the judicial
remedy for wrongful discharge as applied to workers' compensation
claimants constitutes an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power.
If so, both the contractual and tort remedies for illegal employer
activity directed at injured workers may continue to afford com-
pensation claimants protection.
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INTRODUCTION
The Arkansas General Assembly enacted a dramatic revision of
the State's workers' compensation law during its 79th Session.' The
reworking of the basic public protection for workers injured in job-
related contexts will undoubtedly be viewed as a major and positive
stroke by the insurance industry.2 However, the change in focus
from the traditional paternalism implicit in most compensation
schemes3 does not bode favorably for the state's workers who are
subject to both its protections and limitations.4
1. 1993 Ark. Acts 796. This enactment of House Bill 1615 substantially amended
§§ 11-9-101 through 11-9-911 of the Arkansas Code. For a comprehensive critique
of the Act see John D. Copeland, The New Arkansas Workers' Compensation
Act: Did the Pendulum Swing Too Far?, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 1 (1994).
2. For a thorough discussion of the history of this recent revision in Arkansas
workers' compensation law see Philip Pesek, The New Workers' Compensation
Law: What Happens Now?, ARK. LAW., Summer 1993, at 20. This symposium
documents the legislative change from the perspective of the insurance industry,
Joseph H. Purvis, From the Respondent: Workers' Compensation Reform; An
Attempt to Save the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg, ARK. LAW., Summer 1993,
at 25, and from labor's perspective, Zan Davis, From the Claimant: Workers'
Compensation Reform; Cutting Costs by Eliminating Employees from Coverage,
ARK. LAW., Summer 1993, at 27. Pesek notes generally that the management and
industry-dominated committee formed by Arkansas Insurance Commissioner, Lee
Douglass, "carried the majority of votes [on contested provisions] and the result
of their work was a management-oriented recommendation." Pesek, supra, at 20.
3. The revision is explained by the General Assembly as necessary to ensure
the fiscal integrity of the system, as well as to provide medical services necessary
to restore injured workers to employability. Section 1 of Act 796 sets forth the
legislative policy in revising the workers' compensation scheme:
The primary purposes of the workers' compensation laws are to pay timely
temporary and permanent disability benefits to all legitimately injured
workers that suffer an injury or disease arising out of and in the course
of their employment, to pay reasonable and necessary medical expenses
1994]
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The sweeping reform favoring industry may be seen in general
terms, such as in the mandated shift in the standard of review from
one of "liberal construction" of the Act5 to benefit the aggrieved
worker to one of "strict compliance." '6 Or it may be evidenced in
particular provisions which affect the standard of proof of com-
pensable injury, such as the shift in the burden of proof on the
issue of total disability.
7
resulting therefrom and then to return the worker to the workforce, and
to improve workplace safety through safety programs; improve health care
delivery through use of managed care concepts; encourage the return to
work of injured workers; deter and punish frauds of agents, brokers,
solicitors, employers and employees relating to procurement of workers'
compensation coverage or the provision or denial of benefits; curtail the
rise in medical costs associated with the provision of workers' compensation
benefits; and emphasize that the workers' compensation system in this
state must be returned to a state of economic viability.
HD 1615, Sec. 1(B), amending ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-101 (emphasis added).
4. See generally Davis, supra note 2, at 27, concluding:
Act 796 of 1993 will attempt to reduce workers' compensation costs by
simply eliminating large groups of injured workers from coverage. Spe-
cifically, many 'gradual' injuries, psychological injuries, injuries resulting
from aggravation of preexisting conditions, and those suffering from work
related respiratory or heart problems will be significantly restricted or
entirely eliminated from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Law.
5. See e.g., Holiday Inn-West v. Coleman, 31 Ark. App. 224, 792 S.W.2d
345 (1990) (holding Workers' Compensation Commission and state courts are
required to construe provisions of Act liberally to give effect to its remedial purpose).
6. Section 35 of Act 796 sets forth the legislature's expressed position on the
development of workers' compensation law in Arkansas:
The Seventy-Ninth General Assembly realizes that the Arkansas Workers'
Compensation statutes must be revised and amended from time to time.
Unfortunately many of the changes made by this act were necessary because
Administrative Law Judges, the Workers' Compensation Commission, and
the Arkansas Courts have continually broadened the scope and eroded the
purpose of the Workers' Compensation statutes of this state .... In the
future if such things as the Statute of Limitations; the standard of review
by the Workers' Compensation Commission or courts; the extent to which
any physical condition, injury or disease should be excluded from or added
to coverage by the law; or the scope of the Workers' Compensation statutes
need to be liberalized, broadened, or narrowed it shall be addressed by
the General Assembly and should not be done by Administrative Law
Judges, the Workers' Compensation Commission or the courts.
7. For instance, former § 11-9-519(b) provided that: "In the absence of clear
and convincing proof to the contrary, loss of both hands, both arms, both legs,
both eyes, or any two (2) thereof shall constitute permanent total disability." ARK.
CODE ANN. § 11-9-519(b) (1987) (amended 1993). The amended version adds a
further burden to the claimant in seeking compensation for total disability. Sub-
section (e) of the revised version provides: "'Permanent total disability' means
inability, because of compensable injury or occupational disease, to earn any
meaningful wages in the same or other employment. The burden of proof shall
be on the employee to prove inability to earn any meaningful wage in the same
or other employment." ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-519(e) (Michie Supp. 1993).
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One important aspect of the General Assembly's restriction on
the general workers' compensation remedy involves the specific ab-
rogation of the judicially recognized remedy for wrongful discharge
of a compensation claimant by an employer based on the employee's
reliance on his statutory remedy for recovery. In two 1991 decisions,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger and Mapco, Inc. v. Payne,9 the
Arkansas Supreme Court had recognized that Arkansas public policy
afforded a cause of action to workers' compensation claimants
discharged by their employers in retaliation for pursuing compen-
sation benefits.
Act 796 expressly disavows the remedy recognized by the state
supreme court in Baysinger and Payne.'0 Section 6 of the Act amends
former section 11-9-107 to provide for an administrative remedy and
potential criminal liability for discriminatory action by an employer
in discharging an employee who relies on the workers' compensation
statutory remedy." The provision directs that the court's decisions
8. 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991).
9. 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991). Justice Corbin wrote the majority
opinion, with Justices Hayes and Brown dissenting.
10. This action reflects a general tendency of the General Assembly in enacting
Act 796 to legislatively annul prior judicial decisions. Thus, in defining "compensable
injury" in Section 2 of the Act-amending prior § 11-9-102 of the Arkansas Code-
the legislature specifically sought to annul prior commission and court proceedings
on point in subsection 5(C): "(C) Any and all prior decision by the Commission
and the Courts inconsistent with the definition of compensable injury as herein set
forth are hereby specifically annulled, repealed, and held for naught."
11. Section 6 in its entirety states:
SECTION 6. Arkansas Code Ann. 11-9-107 is amended to read as follows:
"11-9-107. Penalties for discrimination for filing claim.
Any employer who willfully discriminates in regard to the hiring or
tenure of work or any term or condition of work of any individual on
account of the individual's claim for benefits under this chapter, or who
in any manner obstructs or impedes the filing of claims for benefits under
this chapter shall be subject to a fine of up to ten thousand dollars
($10,000) as determined by the Workers' Compensation Commission. This
fine shall be payable to the Workers' Compensation Commission Second
Injury Fund and paid by the employer and not by the carrier. In addition,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover costs and a reasonable
attorney's fee payable from the fine; provided however, if the employee
is the nonprevailing party, the attorney's fee and costs shall, at the election
of the employer, be paid by the employee or deducted from future workers'
compensation benefits. The employer may also be guilty of a Class D
felony. This section shall not be construed as establishing an exception to
the 'employment at will doctrine.' A purpose of this section is to preserve
the exclusive remedy doctrine and specifically annul any case law incon-
sistent herewith, including but not necessarily limited to: Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., vs. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991); Mapco, Inc.
vs. Payne, 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991); and Thomas vs. Valmac
1994]
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:373
in Baysinger and Payne, along with the decision in Thomas v. Valmac
Industries, 2 are annulled, consistent with the legislative purpose of
preserving the newly created legislative remedy as exclusive under
the Act. 3
This article surveys the development of the retaliatory discharge
remedy in Arkansas. The first section focuses on the action taken
by the General Assembly in passing Act 796; the next section discusses
the evolution of the remedy prior to the recent legislative action in
light of alternative remedies under Arkansas law and in comparison
with remedies recognized in other jurisdictions.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE REMEDY FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE: ACT
796
Responding to the judicial recognition of a civil remedy for
discharge of a workers' compensation claimant in violation of state
law, '4 the General Assembly included a wrongful discharge remedy
in its comprehensive reformation of the state's workers' compensation
scheme. The remedy includes two dimensions: creation of an ad-
ministrative sanction against an offending employer by fine of up
to $10,000 and potential liability for criminal prosecution as a class
D felony. 5 In addition, the remedy is deemed exclusive by the
legislature, with language specifically purporting to "annul" the state
supreme court decisions recognizing a civil remedy for wrongful
discharge. 6 Assuming that Arkansas courts uphold the Act against
constitutional challenge or otherwise refuse to permit alternative
causes of action for wrongful discharge to proceed in accord with
the expressed legislative intent, 7 the administrative and criminal
Industries. 306 Ark. 228, 812 S.W.2d 673 (1991)."
1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 6 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107 (Michie Supp.
1993)).
12. 306 Ark. 228, 812 S.W.2d 673 (1991).
13. See supra note 11 for text of Section 6 which expressly declares the legislative
intent to "annul" the decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court.
14. Former § 11-9-107 provided for criminal penalties for employers discharging
injured workers in retaliation for the employees reliance on the statutorily-created
workers' compensation system. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107 (1987) (amended 1993).
This expression of Arkansas public policy was relied upon by the court in Baysinger,
306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991), and Payne, 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 463
(1991), to justify recognition of the civil remedy based on discharge in breach of
public policy.
15. See supra note 11.
16. See supra note 11.
17. In Baysinger, the court rejected the argument that the "exclusive remedy"
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act precluded recourse to civil remedies
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remedies in section 6 of Act 796 will control this aspect of employer/
employee relations in the future.
A. The Constitutional Question Posed by Section 6
While workers' compensation statutes have been upheld against
broad constitutional challenges, 8 the abrogation of the wrongful
discharge remedy attempted by the General Assembly in adopting
section 6 of the Act poses a more narrow question. Section 6 purports
to abrogate the judicial remedy for wrongful discharge and to substitute
statutory remedies preserving the "employment at will" doctrine. 9
The constitutional authority for creation of a workers'
compensation remedy rests in Article 5, section 32 of the state
constitution, which generally provides that the legislature is authorized
to enact laws governing compensation to be paid by employers for
injuries suffered by employees. 20 This provision also precludes
additional legislative action controlling the amount of recovery in
other actions and preserves the right to recovery for loss in the
not included in the statute. 306 Ark. at 243-45, 812 S.W.2d at 466-67. The decision
effectively overruled the holding in Johnson v. Houston General Ins. Co., 259
Ark. 724, 536 S.W.2d 121 (1976), in which the court had affirmed the trial court's
reliance on the "exclusive remedy" concept to dismiss a civil complaint predicated
on the employer's purposeful delay in settling the claim. Johnson had been relied
on by the court in Cain v. National Union Life Ins. Co., 290 Ark. 240, 718
S.W.2d 444 (1986), when an action for bad faith on the part of the employer was
again dismissed based on the existence of exclusive remedies under the Workers'
Compensation Act for the activities alleged to have been engaged in by the employer.
18. See Odom v. Arkansas Pipe & Scrap Material Co., 208 Ark. 678, 187
S.W.2d 320 (1945); Young v. G.L. Tarlton, Inc., 204 Ark. 283, 162 S.W.2d 477
(1942); and Barth v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 212 Ark. 942, 208 S.W.2d 455
(1948); Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991) (Hayes, J., dissenting).
19. See supra note 11, for complete text of section 6. The specific reference
to the doctrine of "at will" employment provides: "This section shall not be
construed as establishing an exception to the 'employment at will doctrine."' For
a general discussion concerning developments in the doctrine of "at-will employ-
ment," particularly involving the drafting of the Model Employment Termination
Act, see Randall Samborn, At-Will Doctrine Under Fire, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14,
1991, at 1.
20. ARK. CONST., art. V, § 32 provides, in its entirety:
The General Assembly shall have power to enact laws prescribing the
amount of compensation to be paid by employers for injuries to or death
of employees, and to whom said payment shall be made. It shall have
power to provide the means, methods, and forum for adjudicating claims
arising under said laws, and for securing payment of same. Provided, that
otherwise no law shall be enacted limiting the amount to be recovered
for injuries resulting in death or for injuries to persons or property; and
in case of death from such injuries the right of action shall survive, and
the General Assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit such action shall
be prosecuted.
19941
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event of death.2' Consequently, the grant of authority included in
this constitutional provision is limited, rather than general.
The General Assembly's action in creation of an exclusive remedy
for retaliatory discharge and abrogation of the judicially recognized
remedy is subject to challenge because regulation of the employment
relationship is simply not sanctioned by the provision authorizing
creation of a workers' compensation scheme.Y Instead, a strict reading
of the state constitution compels the conclusion that the legislature's
authority to implement a compensation remedy is specifically limited
to the operation of the compensation system and establishing benefit
levels. 23 In fact, the authority to implement the system has been
interpreted as limited to the power to supplant traditional liability24
with exclusive remedies for compensation for work-related injuries. 25
Consequently, the attempt to expand upon the legislative authority
conferred by Article 5, section 32 to include regulation of the
employment relationship itself is clearly not contemplated by the
precise wording of the constitutional provision; nor could such a
grant of authority be inferred from a fair reading of the constitutional
language. Assuming the Arkansas Supreme Court would apply the
same standard of "strict construction" in evaluating a challenge to
section 6 of the Act 796 that the General Assembly mandated for
construction of the Act itself,26 the attempt to regulate the employment
21. Id.
22. In Baldwin Co. v. Maner, 224 Ark. 348, 352, 273 S.W.2d 28, 30 (1954),
the court held that regulation of recovery is appropriate only where the employer/
employee relationship is established. Consequently, the legislature is powerless to
attempt regulation of recovery in the absence of an employment relationship. Yet,
section 6 purports to regulate employer conduct in hiring to prevent discriminatory
decisions not to hire based on an applicant's prior reliance on the statutory
compensation remedy. Section 6, therefore, contemplates regulation of conduct
outside the scope of the employment relationship because it purports to regulate
conduct that actually predates the creation of the employment relationship. By
analogy, Baldwin Co. v. Maner might well support the conclusion that the narrow
grant of authority to the legislature under the state constitution cannot include any
regulation beyond that of recovery for compensable injuries suffered as a conse-
quence of employment.
23. See supra note 20.
24. See generally Bridges v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 733 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1163 (1985) (analyzing function of workers' com-
pensation scheme against constitutional challenge under Texas law); 1 Arthur Larson,
THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 5.20-5.30 (1985).
25. Odom v. Arkansas Pipe & Scrap Material Co., 208 Ark. 678, 187 S.W.2d
320 (1945).
26. Section 35 of Act 796 expressly criticizes the actions of the Arkansas courts,
Workers' Compensation Commission, and Administrative Law Judges in expanding
the rights of claimants and demands deference to a standard of strict construction
in the application of the provisions of the Act. See supra note 6.
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relationship in section 6 would undoubtedly fail as violative of the
limited grant of authority to the legislature by the state constitution.
Any conclusion on the court's part that section 6 is unconstitutional
would leave the remainder of Act 796 intact27 and presumably resurrect
the judicially recognized cause of action for wrongful discharge relied
on by the claimants in Baysinger28 and Payne.29
On the other hand, a decision upholding section 6 as constitutional
would serve to preclude reliance on the civil remedy for discharge
in retaliation for the filing of a workers' compensation claim.30 A
review of the administrative and criminal liability imposed under
section 6 demonstrates the inadequacy of the protection purportedly
afforded compensation claimants by its terms. Somewhat ironically,
the General Assembly's action was predicated on reaffirmation of
the doctrine of "employment at will," as expressed in section 6. 3'
However, the doctrine itself is of judicial origin, rather than
constitutional or statutory imperative.3 2
B. The Nature of the Remedy
1. The Administrative Remedy
Under section 6, an employer who discriminates in hiring or
terminates a workers' compensation claimant, or otherwise interferes
with or impedes the filing of a workers' compensation claim, is
subject to an administratively imposed fine of up to $10,000.11 At
the outset, this potential liability for the actions of a discriminating
employer would appear significant and likely to deter illegal conduct.
However, the administration of the civil penalty suggests a number
27. Act 796 includes a savings clause in section 39 which provides that any
section declared unconstitutional will be deemed severed from the remainder of the
Act.
28. 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991).
29. 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991).
30. For an analysis of the tort remedy, see discussion infra part I1.
31. See supra note 11.
32. Griffin v. Erickson, 277 Ark. 433, 436, 642 S.W.2d 308, 310 (1982) (re-
affirming judicially-recognized doctrine of employment at will in Arkansas). In
other jurisdictions state courts have justified their recognition of civil actions for
retaliation or wrongful discharge as an exception to the "at-will employment"
doctrine precisely because the doctrine is of judicial origin. See Vigil v. Arzola,
699 P.2d 613, 619 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983). The doctrine is typically long-standing
in the jurisdiction. See e.g., East Line & R.R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 10 S.W. 99, 102
(1888) (recognizing doctrine in Texas). For a discussion of the erosion of the
doctrine in Arkansas, see Mark L. Martin, Comment, Wrongful Discharge of
Employees Terminable at Will-A New Theory of Liability in Arkansas, 34 ARK.
L. REV. 729 (1981).
33. 1993 Ark. Acts 796 § 6; see supra note 11.
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of problems. First, although a fine in the maximum amount might
well serve to deter employer illegality in discriminating against
compensation claimants, the statutory language is ambiguous in two
important respects.
Initially, the problem of proof of an employer violation under
the Act will be complicated. The claimant or the commission must
establish that any discrimination inflicted against a claimant/employee
or prospective employee was "willful," 3 4 as opposed to incidental
to other potentially legitimate concerns of the employer in making
an employment decision. For example, an employer faced with rising
compensation premiums might well conclude that any employee
suffering a work-related injury presented an unacceptable threat in
terms of future costs for coverage and elect to terminate the employee.3"
This very real business concern for managing overhead costs should
hardly permit the employer to manipulate future premium levels by
simply terminating injured employees claiming benefits under the
Act, but whether this conduct would be deemed willful in the usual
sense of discriminatory intent is not specifically addressed in the
language of section 6.36
Moreover, the problem posed by the burden of proof is not
insignificant, since the imposition of both administrative and criminal
penalties is predicated on proof of willfulness. A difficult question
of intent is presented by the employer who terminates or refuses to
hire on the ground that the injury or prior history of injury likely
makes the employee less physically capable of performing the tasks
associated with employment.37 In a sense, an employer concerned
34. The term "willful" is not defined in Section 6 of Act 796, codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 11-9-107 (Michie Supp. 1993), nor is it defined specifically in the
definitions section of the Act, section 2, codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102
(kl'chic Supp. 1993)
35. Some employment decisions are clearly made on the basis of concern for
worker fitness and costs associated with workers' compensation coverage. For
instance, in Hunt v. Van Der Horst Corp., 711 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986), the appellate court reversed a grant of summary judgment for the employer
on a retaliatory discharge claim based, in part, on the plaintiff's responsive affidavit
which averred that a manager had stated during a meeting of the plant accident
board that 'Workers' Compensation was going up every time someone got hurt
and that we had to stop it."' Id. at 80. Similarly, concern for rising compensation
coverage premiums was a factor demonstrating a retaliatory motive in Murray
Corp. v. Brooks, 600 S.W.2d 897, 901 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980).
36. However, the decision in Mapco, Inc. v. Payne, 306 Ark. 198, 200-02, 812
S.W.2d 483, 485-86 (1991), clearly suggests that a business motive for refusal to
rehire an injured former employee after completion of her convalescence would
not have barred recovery on a claim for wrongful termination brought under the
cause of action recognized there.
37. In fact, Arkansas courts have recognized the right of employers to inquire
[Vol. 16:373
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about the problem of re-injury not only manifests concern for
overhead, but may realistically be reflecting legitimate concern for
the long-term health or safety of the injured employee or the safety
of coworkers dependent upon the ability of the injured employee
to perform successfully. The employer's decision on hiring or
termination in this situation may well involve discrimination, but
not the type of "willful" discrimination the General Assembly intended
to punish with either administrative or criminal penalties.38
Additionally, the language is less than promising because it
provides no minimum penalty which might be levied against a
discriminating employer. Consequently, there is no assurance that
any fine at all will be imposed against an offender. In fact, some
employer illegality may go essentially unpunished because the Act
contains no specific guidelines for assessing what fine may be
appropriate in a particular circumstance. This is particularly true
with respect to discrimination involving hiring or interference in the
prosecution of a compensation claim, rather than termination.3 9 The
degree of injury attributable to such illegality may be difficult to
assess, especially in the case of discriminatory decisions not to hire,
in pre-employment contexts about prior injuries or receipt of benefits under the
Workers' Compensation Act. See, e.g., Shock v. Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc., 270
Ark. 57, 603 S.W.2d 446 (Ark. App. 1980); Baldwin v. Club Prods. Co., 270
Ark. 155, 604 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. App. 1980); DeFrancisco v. Arkansas Kraft Corp.,
5 Ark. App. 195, 636 S.W.2d 291 (1982); Mack v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 28 Ark.
App. 229, 771 S.W.2d 794 (1989).
38. Section 6 specifically addresses discrimination in refusing to hire, providing
in pertinent part: "Any employer who willfully discriminates in regard to the hiring
or tenure of work or any term or condition of work of any individual on account
of the individual's claim for benefits under this chapter. . . ." 1993 Ark. Acts 796,
§ 6 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107 (Michie Supp. 1993)) (emphasis added).
Other jurisdictions have split with respect to whether discrimination in refusing
to hire is actionable under their wrongful discharge causes of action. Compare
Smith v. Coffee's Shop for Boys & Men, Inc., 536 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Ct. App.
1976) (stating that statutory remedy does not include reference to discrimination
in refusing to hire prior compensation claimant) with Shaw v. Doyle Milling Co.,
683 P.2d 82 (Or. 1984) (applying OR. REV. STAT. § 659:415 (1977) which precludes
discrimination in hiring based on prior history of compensation claim) and Mo-
rehouse v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 201 Cal. Rptr. 154 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (holding refusal to hire actionable in construction of statute extending remedy
to "any employee" where employee's foss of employment occurred as a result of
work related injury sustained while employed by same company). The same rationale
for precluding non-discrimination in hiring exists for rehiring decisions under the
language of the Arkansas statute and the prior statute which provided the basis
for the plaintiff's claim in Mapco, Inc., 306 Ark. at 200-01, 812 S.W.2d at 485.
39. Section 6 expressly includes discrimination in terms of hiring or setting the
terms or conditions of work, or impeding the filing or obstructing the processing
of a workers' compensation claim. See supra note 11 for text of Section 6.
1994]
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because it will be virtually impossible to prove, except through
circumstantial evidence, that an employer has based a non-hiring
decision on an employee's prior compensation claim. An employer
may elect to evade liability under the Act by asserting a non-
discriminatory reason for refusing to hire, perhaps including a good
faith belief that a prior history of injury renders the prospective
employee insufficiently physically fit to undertake the work activities
involved in the employment. 40
Assertion of an apparently non-discriminatory motive as an
alternative theory for the action, or as one of a number of reasons
for the action, will likely provide discriminating employers with a
ground of defense in the event the Commission should actually
contemplate a claim. The language of the Act fails to provide for
imposition of penalties regardless of whether "discriminatory" intent
is the sole cause or one of multiple causes of the discriminatory
act.
4
'
Second, section 6 suggests, but fails to define, the process by
which a claim of discrimination may be raised and litigated. The
statutory language does, however, clearly indicate that a claim may
be brought on behalf of the claimant because it provides that
attorneys' fees may be awarded and paid from the fine imposed. 42
Nevertheless, the procedure does not provide that any sum will be
paid to the aggrieved claimant, regardless of the amount of fine
imposed. Further, in the event the claim of discrimination is not
sustained, attorneys' fees may be taxed against the claimant in favor
of the employer and even ordered paid in installments from prospective
compensation payments .41
Consequently, the administrative remedy created by the General
Assembly in section 6 offers no compensatory feature for the claimant
which would encourage the filing of a claim with the Commission.
The emplore/claimant has nn rrnognizedl merhanism for nhtainina
40. This defense failed in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239,
246, 812 S.W.2d 463, 467 (1991).
41. For an analysis of the "sole cause" burden of proof, see discussion infra
part IV.
42. Section 6 provides, in pertinent part:
In addition, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover costs and
a reasonable attorney's fee payable from the fine; provided however, if
the employee is the nonprevailing party, the attorney's fee and costs shall,
at the election of the employer, be paid by the employee or deducted
from future workers' compensation benefits.
1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 6 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107(2)(b) (Michie
Supp. 1993)).
43. Id,
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compensation based on the discrimination; on the contrary, the Act
provides that an unsuccessful complaint may actually render the
claimant liable for attorneys' fees for the employer's defense counsel.
Finally, although the potential fine may appear significant, the
$10,000 limitation on fine authority may prove inadequate to deter
employer illegality. Some employers may simply elect to discharge
injured employees as a rational business decision, assuming the long-
range potential liability for additional expenses in the event the
employee is retained will exceed whatever fine might actually be
imposed. In addition, the employer may treat any fine as a deductible
business expense, even though the Act precludes coverage for illegality
by the compensation carrier," reducing the actual cost of liability
arising from a wrongful discharge.
The potential range of administrative liability imposed under
Act 796 is less onerous than the damages assessed in Baysinger45 or
Payne." Comparison of the very limited history of recovery under
the civil action recognized by the state supreme court with the
maximum punishment provisions of Act 796 suggests that, at least
in terms of economic liability, discrimination has a less costly range
of potential consequence under the legislatively created remedy of
the Act than under pre-existing civil remedies. However, the Act
retains the criminal liability feature of former Section 11-9-107 and
increases the potential criminal liability for violation.
2. Criminal Liability
Act 796 retains a general statement of public policy declaring
employer discrimination against workers' compensation claimants to
be illegal. In addition, like Act 796, the prior act also provided for
44. Id. Section 6 specifically provides: "This fine shall be payable to the Workers'
Compensation Commission Second Injury Fund and paid by the employer and not
by the carrier." This approach is consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions
which have held that compensation for illegal discriminatory employer action is
not appropriate under coverage designed to provide for actual payment of benefits.
See Artco-Bell Corp. v. Liberty-Mutual Ins. Co., 649 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1983); Rubenstein Lumber Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 462 N.E.2d
660, 661 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); see also Roxanne L. Holmes, Insurance Coverage
for Claims of Wrong Employment Termination, 91 DICK. L. REV. 895 (1987)
(discussing holding in Artco-Bell).
45. The jury returned a verdict for $24,000 in compensatory damages. 306 Ark.
at 241, 812 S.W.2d at 464 (1991).
46. The jury awarded the employee $15,000. 306 Ark. at 199, 812 S.W.2d at
484 (1991).
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criminal liability to be predicated on proof of "willful
discrimination. ' 47 However, the potential liability, both in terms of
fine and incarceration, has been dramatically increased in the amended
version. Originally, the potential fine was $100 and the range of
incarceration was limited to six months in jail upon proof of a
violation .48
The increase in penalty range to a potential fine of $10,000
and liability for 'a Class D felony is certainly facially significant.
However, the Act does not mandate prosecution in the event "willful"
discrimination is demonstrated. The language is permissive in this
respect, simply providing that criminal liability "may" be imposed.49
In contrast, the preceding section of Act 796 provides that in the
event of a misrepresentation-presumably directed at the filing or
prosecution of a false claim-the party advancing the misrepresentation
"shall be guilty of a Class D felony." 50
The distinction between the terminology in the two sections may
well reflect anti-employee bias in the operation of the Act itself.
Section 5 is directed toward misrepresentation in the prosecution or
defense of compensation claims, and this liability is rather definite
given the choice of "shall" to describe its application. The use of
"shall" usually is directive in legislation, reflecting a mandatory
intent on the part of the legislature.5 In contrast, the use of "may"
is permissive in nature, reflecting commitment of discretion.5 2 While
47. The prior act provided:
Any employer who willfully discriminates in regard to the hiring or tenure
of work or any term or condition of work of any individual on account
of his claiming benefits under this chapter or who in any manner obstructs
or impedes the filing of claims for benefits under this chapter shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction shall be punished by a fine
of not to exceed one hundred ($100) dollars, or by imprisonment of not
to excccd six (6) months, or by both fine and imprisonment.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107 (1987) (emphasis added) (amended 1993).
48. Id.
49. Section 6 provides, in pertinent part: "The employer may also be guilty of
a Class D felony." 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 6 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-
9-107(2)(c) (Michie Supp. 1993)) (emphasis added).
50. Section 5 of Act 796 provides the penalties for misrepresentation:
Any person or entity who willfully and knowingly makes any material
false statement or representation for the purpose of obtaining any benefit
or payment, or for the purpose of defeating or wrongfully increasing or
wrongfully decreasing any claim for benefit or payment or obtaining or
avoiding workers' compensation coverage or avoiding payment of the proper
insurance premimum (or who aids and abets for either of said purposes),
under this chapter shall be guilty of a Class D felony ....
Id. § 5(a) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-106(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 1993))
(emphasis added).
51. See, e.g., In re Bailey, 299 Ark. 352, 354, 771 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1989).
52. See, e.g., Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 229, 800 S.W.2d 717,
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it is true that the normally mandatory "shall" may be construed
to be permissive to avoid absurdity in construction," the tenor of
the legislation clearly suggests an employer bias. The legislature
delegates discretion to state prosecutors to pursue criminal actions
against discriminating employers, yet imposes mandatory criminal
liability for misrepresentation in the filing or prosecution of a
compensation claim.54 Thus, while culpability for misrepresentation
is imposed equally against offending employers and claimants in the
context of litigation of a claim for compensation or determination
of benefit levels, the imposition of culpability in the event of employer
discrimination, even apparently when proved in an administrative
action, remains discretionary.
While Section 5 remedies directed at misrepresentation may well
appear neutral in directing prosecution of either claimants or employers
engaging in "willful" misrepresentation in an attempt to obtain or
preclude benefits, or in the setting or alteration of benefit levels,
a review of the section indicates far greater emphasis is given to
this aspect of compliance with the Act than in Section 6. For example,
upon a showing of a Section 5 violation, the Act mandates referral
for prosecution. 5  In contrast, imposition of criminal liability under
Section 6 is permissive and not directive. Section 5 also provides
for creation of a fraud investigation section within the Commission
52. See, e.g., Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 229, 800 S.W.2d 717,
718 (1990).
53. See, e.g., Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Mabry, 229 Ark. 261, 269,
315 S.W.2d 900, 905 (1958).
54. However, this is not to say that an employer could incur or suffer no
liability under Section 5 of Act 796, particularly if a misrepresentation as to notice
or the circumstances of a work-related injury was advanced in an attempt to defeat
the claim for compensation. See supra note 49 for the relevant language. Thus,
an offending employer is subjected to the same degree of criminal liability for the
willful and knowing misrepresentation made to defeat a claim for compensation
or to secure a decrease in benefits as is a misrepresenting employee.
55. Section 5(c) of Act 796 amends Section 11-9-106 to provide, in pertinent
part:
Where the commission or the Insurance Commissioner finds that false
or misleading statements or representations were made willfully and know-
ingly for the purpose of obtaining benefits or payments, or for the purpose
of obtaining, wrongfully increasing, wrongfully decreasing, or defeating
any claim for benefit or payment or obtaining or avoiding workers'
compensation coverage or avoiding payment of the proper insurance pre-
mium, under this chapter, the chairman of the commission or the Insurance
Commissioner shall refer the matter for appropriate action to the pros-
ecuting attorney of the district where the original hearing was held.
1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 5(c) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-106(c) (Michie
Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
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which is charged with the responsibility of determining whether
misrepresentations have been made . 6 Particularly significant is the
section requiring employers and carriers, upon threat of civil and
criminal sanctions, to report claims of violations while immunizing
them from civil actions based on such reporting. 7 Contrarily,
employees are immunized from civil liability for reporting suspected
violations by management or carriers, but no additional legislative
directive mandating disclosure is imposed."8
The creation of penalties for failure to take action to trigger
investigation of suspected employee fraud demonstrates the extent
to which concern for fraud permeates the legislative action in adopting
the provisions of Act 796. No comparable demonstration of resolve
accompanies the permissive suggestion of criminal liability for employer
discrimination directed at an employee for seeking compensation
under the statutory compensation scheme.
Whether the administrative or criminal liability provisions of
Act 796 will serve to actually deter employer discrimination based
on the claiming of compensation benefits might be reserved for
evaluation of the system in the future. However, the history of the
pre-existing criminal penalties of Section 11-9-107 does not demonstrate
any effort at criminal prosecution eventually resulting in published
appellate decisions memorialized in the annotations to the section.
The lack of any appellate history of this section might well suggest
that it effectively served to deter employer illegality, but if so, the
increase in potential criminal liability would hardly have been justified
or necessary. Moreover, the decisions in Baysinger and Payne
56. 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § (d) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-106(d)
(Michie Supp. 1993)).
57. 1993 Ark. Acts 796, § (d)(8) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-106(d)(6)
i 1V11llei Supp. 1773)), prUviue.
Every carrier or employer who has reason to suspect that a violation
of subdivision (a)(1) of this section has occurred shall be required to report
all pertinent matters relating thereto to the Workers' Compensation Fraud
Investigation Unit. No such carrier shall be liable to any employer or
employee for any such report, and no employer shall be liable to any
employee for such a report unless they knowingly and intentionally include
false information. Any such carrier or employer who knowingly and in-
tentionally fails to report any such violation shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
and on conviction shall be punished by fine not to exceed one thousand
dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment for a period not to exceed one (1)
year, or by both fine and imprisonment. Although not mandated to report
suspected violations of subdivision (a)(l) of this section by an employer
or employee, any employee who does make such a report shall not be
liable to the employer or employee whose suspected violations he has
reported.
58. Id.
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demonstrate that total compliance with the prior act was not achieved;
additionally, there is no evidence that these civil actions were
accompanied by criminal prosecutions. Consequently, one reasonable
inference is that the imposition of criminal liability is virtually
meaningless and that civil remedies for damages are the appropriate
way to deter employer illegality or compensate an injured employee
when such illegality is demonstrated.
Nevertheless, the legislature has acted to annul the judically
recognized civil remedy, perhaps effectively insulating employers from
any realistic possibility of deterrence.
C. The Exclusivity of Remedy Question
The legislative action also attempts to prevent recognition of
alternative remedies to Section 6 in the future.5 9 In its attempt to
preserve exclusivity, the General Assembly expressly sought to annul
the principal wrongful discharge decisions in Baysinger and Payne.
To the extent that this attempt to preserve exclusivity is given effect,
the civil remedy recognized as available to aggrieved workers'
compensation claimants in those decisions would no longer be viable.
Four possible consequences of judicial intervention in this scheme
should be considered by prospective plaintiffs and their counsel.
First, the appellate courts might well conclude that the legislative
fiat with regard to regulation of the employment relationship does
exceed the constitutional authority granted to the General Assembly
to regulate compensation for work-related injuries, as suggested
earlier. This determination of the constitutional question would
effectively restore the range of remedies available to the claimant
suffering discrimination before passage of Act 796, including the
implied contract action approved by the Arkansas Supreme Court
in Baysinger and Payne.
Second, the state supreme court might uphold the General
Assembly's action in abrogating those decisions in favor of the
administrative and criminal remedies expressly provided to claimants
suffering discrimination in Section 6 of Act 796. This approach
would affirm the legislative action in nullifying the court's recognition
of the implied contract action for workers' compensation claimants
proving discriminatory employer conduct;
Third, the state supreme court could take a more moderate
approach while upholding the legislative action by affirming the
General Assembly's authority to create the administrative remedy
and strengthen the pre-existing criminal remedy for employer
59. See supra note 11.
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discrimination, while holding that these remedies cannot be applied
exclusively. This approach would afford claimants a range of
alternatives in challenging employer discrimination and leave the
General Assembly's additional response to this problem intact.
Finally, the court might conclude, applying a principle of strict
construction to Act 796, that the General Assembly in fact
accomplished exactly what it purported to in annulling Baysinger
and Payne, while leaving recourse to alternative remedies in tort for
outrageous or discriminatory conduct on the part of employers intact.
The tort remedy was in the process of development when the court
announced its position in Sterling Drug v. Oxford6° recognizing the
civil action sounding in contract for retaliatory discharge of whistle-
blowers and others whose termination would violate Arkansas public
policy. Importantly, the Sterling Drug court did not discount the
possibility of asserting a claim for outrage in addition to the contractual
claim for wrongful discharge in that case, finding instead that, on
those facts, the employer's conduct was not so egregious as to
constitute "outrageous" conduct .61
Exclusivity of remedy is an important function of workers'
compensation systems, as the court recognized in Baysinger.62 In
fact, exclusivity formed the basis for Justice Hays's dissenting opinion
in Baysinger, despite his general affirmance of the public policy
against employer retaliation responding to an injured worker's decision
to seek benefits under the Act. 63 Justice Hays concluded that Arkansas
precedent supported the proposition that the Act was comprehensive
in regulating "every eventuality arising from the employment
relationship."64 However, he did not consider the language of the
state constitution that grants to the General Assembly its authority
to create a compensation system, including the apparent lack of any
specific delegation of authority to regulate the employment relationship
60. 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988).
61. Id. at 244, 743 S.W.2d at 382-83.
62. 306 Ark. 239, 244, 812 S.W.2d 463, 466 (1991) (citing Johnson v. Houston
Gen. Ins. Co., 259 Ark. 724, 536 S.W.2d 121 (1976) (involving an Act that provided
exclusive remedy for employer's alleged tardiness in making payments and purposeful
delay in settlement of claim) and Cain v. Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 290 Ark.
240, 718 S.W.2d 444 (1986) (holding claim for employer's bad faith in not settling
compensation claim could not be pursued outside remedies authorized by Act)).
63. 306 Ark. at 250, 812 S.W.2d at 469 (Hays, J., dissenting) (concluding that
statutory remedy provided in former Section 11-9-107 is exclusive remedy for
employer retaliation).
64. Id.
[Vol. 16:373
WORKERS COMPENSATION
beyond the question of providing a scheme for compensation of
work-related injuries.
In fact, of course, the remedies authorized by the Act are not
exclusive in a comprehensive sense because of the existence of
important federally-protected rights that are enforceable through
remedies created by Congress. The most significant of these potential
remedies may eventually lie in the adoption of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which presents dramatic consequences for employers
superficially secure in their autonomy by the doctrine of employment
at-will. 61 In addition, other federal remedies provide alternative sources
of rights which restrict the employer in the employment relationship,
including federal anti-discrimination legislation,66 legislation specifically
protecting certain whistle-blowers ,67 and federal collective bargaining
legislation which permits employees to bargain for discharge and
grievance procedures limiting employer autonomy. 68 The existence of
alternative federal remedies to address certain types of employer
discrimination has already effectively reduced the traditional employer
autonomy associated with the doctrine of employment at-will.69 This
suggests the General Assembly's declared purpose of protecting that
doctrine may prove far less significant than one might expect.
II. THE RECENT EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL REMEDY FOR
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMANTS
The decisions in Baysinger7° and Payne71 built upon the court's
earlier holding in Sterling Drug v. Oxford,72 in which the court had
65. 42 US.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. IV 1992); See generally Ranko S. Oliver,
The Impact of Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 on Workers'
Compensation Law, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 327 (1994).
66. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988); Age Discrim-
ination Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
67. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 11(c), 29 U.S.C.
§ 660(c) (1988); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 312(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a)
(1988); and Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 510, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1140 (1988).
68. The United States Supreme Court has held that state remedies for discrim-
ination arising from state workers' compensation schemes are not preempted by
federal collective bargaining rights pursuant to the Labor Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988). Lingle v. Norge Div. of
Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
69. For an authoritative discussion of the erosion of the doctrine of employment
at will in Arkansas see Jay T. Youngdahl, The Erosion of the Employment-At-
Will Doctrine in Arkansas, 40 ARK. L. REv. 545 (1987) (noting trend undermining
doctrine in Arkansas decisions).
70. 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991).
71. 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991). Payne brought suit alleging that her
employer refused to rehire her after she completed convalescence from knee surgery
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for the first time recognized a wrongful discharge cause of action
for employees employed in the traditional "at will" capacity whose
terminations violated public policy.
The Baysinger, Payne, and Sterling Drug decisions served to
confirm earlier predictions that the doctrine of "employment at will"
would suffer erosion in Arkansas, 73 as it had nationally.7 4 Sterling
Drug arose in the context of a "whistle-blower" case, yet the opinion
clearly suggested that the public policy exception would serve to
limit the doctrine in cases in which the employee's termination results
from the filing or prosecution of a workers' compensation claim. 75
The subsequent decisions in Baysinger and Payne confirmed this
suggestion.
Other jurisdictions had already accepted the need to protect
injured workers from retaliation by employers through the adoption
of legislation 6 or by judicial recognition 77 of an implied remedy to
redress employer discrimination toward employees pursuing remedies
under state created and mandated workers' compensation systems.
The decision in Sterling Drug did not expressly recognize or create
such a remedy, but merely noted the strong public policy deter-
mination that had prompted other jurisdictions to judicially approve
a cause of action for retaliatory discharge in the workers' compen-
sation context.7 8
The remedy recognized by the state supreme court in Sterling
Drug79 is predicated on the theory of breach of implied contract,
required by a work-related injury. The court, through Justice Corbin, concluded
that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Payne's unsuccessful attempt
at re-employment was the result of discrimination on the part of the employer.
Id. at 200-02, 812 S.W.2d 485-86.
72. 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988). See Sarah Lewis, Note, 11 U. ARK.
LrI-LE RoCK L.J. 67 (1988-89) (analyzing decision in Sterling Drug v. Oxford).
73. See Mark L. Martin, Comment, Wrongful Discharge of Employees Ter-
minable at Will-A New Theory of Liability in Arkansas, 34 ARK. L. REV. 729
(1981).
74. See Jay T. Youngdahl, The Erosion of Employment-At- Will Doctrine in
Arkansas, 40 ARK. L. REV. 545 (1987) (noting trend undermining doctrine in
Arkansas decisions).
75. The court observed that retaliatory discharge of compensation claimants
had prompted judicial recognition of the wrongful discharge action in a leading
case, Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973). 294 Ark.
at 247-48, 743 S.W.2d at 384.
76. E.g., TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (West 1967 & Supp. 1987)
(currently codified at TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (West 1994)). This
section has been superceded.
77. Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
78. 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380.
79. 294 Ark. at 249, 743 S.W.2d at 385 (citing Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,
335 N.W.2d 834 (1983)).
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and it was this contractual theory which the court in 1991 extended
to recognize the right of injured workers to recover for discriminatory
discharge. 0 Because employees are particularly vulnerable to both
threats and consequences of termination resulting from the filing of
workers' compensation claims, it is necessary to understand both
the rationale and dimensions of the remedy in order to appreciate
the deficiencies of Sterling Drug in this regard, even while recognizing
the dramatic step forward taken by the court in limiting the virtually
absolute power over employees traditionally exercised by Arkansas
employers .81
A. The Nature of Public Policy Exceptions to the Doctrine of
"At Will" Employment
The protection of whistle-blowers, workers' compensation
claimants, and other classes of employees subject to discrimination
by their employers has generated the most significant source of
exception to continued viability of the doctrine of "at will"
employment.8 2 However, in Arkansas and elsewhere, judicial
modification of the doctrine has also resulted from the recognition
that some employees whose termination violates company-expressed
policies or personnel manual guarantees of private due process are
entitled to sue on the theory of implied contract. 3 The contract is
implied from the employer's expression of policies, particularly in
personnel manual form, and from the employee's reliance on the
expression of such policies to form a relationship that is essentially
contractual, rather than unilaterally beneficial.8 4 Actions founded on
an implied contract, however, are truly contractual in nature since
80. See supra notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text.
81. This autonomy in controlling the employment relationship vested in the
employer was apparently the concern of the General Assembly in expressly noting
that the remedy created in Act 796, section 6, was not intended to modify the
doctrine of "at-will employment." See supra note 11 for pertinent text of section
6.
82. See Sterling Drug, 294 Ark. at 245-49, 743 S.W.2d at 383-85.
83. See Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hosp., 292 Ark. 130, 136, 728 S.W.2d
501, 505 (1987).
84. Id. Compare Justice Purtle's dissenting opinion, characterizing the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine as "archaic" and noting the 1968 decision in Hinson v.
Culberson-Stowers Chevrolet, Inc., 244 Ark. 853, 427 S.W.2d 539 (1968), in which
the court had determined that an at-will employee had the status of "servant" in
the "master/servant" relationship whose physical conduct was "subject to the
master's right of control." 292 Ark. at 137, 728 S.W.2d at 505. Justice Purtle
argued that the personnel manual in issue had created the expectancy that em-
ployment could not be terminated except for cause and that since the employer
had written the manual, it should be bound by its representations. Id. at 138-39,
728 S.W.2d at 506-07.
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the termination is alleged to have violated the agreement between
the employer and the employee which forms the basis for the
employment relationship.
In contrast to the implied contract theory, which affords a
remedy for some terminations even in the absence of an express
contract of employment, the action for retaliatory or discriminatory
discharge is designed to afford redress for employees who suffer
consequences as a result of activity which might be said to lie largely
outside the realm of the traditional contract. An overview of the
public policy exceptions which have typically received rather wide
approval reveals three major concerns of this litigation remedy.
1. Constitutional and Statutory Remedies for Discrimination
While it may be overlooked in the analysis of public policy as
a basis for modification of the doctrine of at will employment, the
single most significant restraint on employer autonomy not arising
from employment contract would appear to be legislation which
makes actionable discharge or other discrimination based upon the
employee's race, ethnic background, national origin, gender, religious
belief, or age.85 Federal legislation, particularly the various civil rights
acts which deal with discrimination by employers whose enterprises
operate within the rather loose definition of interstate commerce,
provides the most significant limitation on employer autonomy. This
is even more likely to be true in southern states, such as Arkansas,
which have experienced the dual historical phenomena of racial
segregation by law and relatively low employee organization by the
national unions.
In addition to the recent domination of employment relationships
by Congressional enactment of civil rights legislation creating both
86 -.A , 4;-87 f,-, n ,-1f ri;s~iiain
some state legislation has also provided significant potential for
85. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988); Age Discrimi-
nation Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
86. Title VII remedies provided by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6,
2000e-8 and 2000e-9 require the filing of a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act
or within 300 days in states with approved enforcement agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e)(l) (Supp. IV 1992).
87. Id. If EEOC does not initiate proceedings against the employer within 180
days, issuance of a right to sue letter permits the complainant to file a civil action
within 90 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988).
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redressing employment discrimination.8 Similarly, federal labor
legislation provides protection for employees seeking to organize or
conduct negotiations leading to collective bargaining agreements.8 9
The National Labor Relations Act provides an administrative remedy
aimed at illegal employer activity designed to frustrate employee
exercise of organization rights under the Act 9° and preempts state
action in this area to create a federally enforced standard of conduct
for employers faced with organization attempts. 91
This type of legislation, however, is general in nature. It purports
to deal with acts of discrimination, including termination, which
result from a generalized discriminatory intent based on the employee's
class or preference, quite apart from any individual animosity directed
toward the employee. 92 The legislation reflects either a constitutionally
or legislatively recognized public policy, but a policy designed to
redress group grievances, rather than one tailored to individual
complaints. Similarly, federal labor legislation protects the class of
employees, even in its protection of individuals, but does not preempt
state legislation to protect the rights of employees not directly related
to the organization or bargaining process. 93
In this sense, this type of generalized legislation promotes broad
public policy concerns necessary to ensure compliance with policies,
such as desegregation, which are broader in social concern than
88. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 5.01 (West 1987), for example,
makes discharge from employment based on race, color, handicap, religion, national
origin, age, or sex actionable. Article 5207a of the same statute prohibits discharge
based on the employee's membership or nonmembership in a union, while discharge
of an employee as a result of his active duty in state armed forces is' prohibited
by article 5765, section 7A of the same statute (currently codified at corresponding
sections (West 1994)).
89. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
90. Id. § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982). For an exhaustive discussion of the
enforcement powers of the National Labor Relations Board, see CHR.Es J. Moluus,
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1599-1694 (2d ed. 1983).
91. See 2 MORRIS, supra note 90, at 1504-98.
92. The National Labor Relations Act purports to protect only "concerted
activities" of employees engaged in for purposes of furthering the group interest
in collective bargaining and organization. Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . ...
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). For an authoritative discussion of the distinction to be
drawn between "concerted activity" and individual activity, see 1 Morris, supra
note 90, at 136-44.
93. In Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988), the
Supreme Court held that federal labor legislation does not preempt state created
remedies for retaliatory discharge of workers compensation claimants.
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simply discrimination on the job. The legislation facilitates the national
policy of eliminating officially sanctioned race-based prejudice, rather
than specifically directing attention toward the circumstances of the
individual employee, even though the individual employee may well
bring the actual claim which prompts compliance with the national
policy.
2. Public Policy Exceptions which Protect Employees from
Refusal to Perform Illegal Acts
The second major source of limitation upon employer autonomy
is the recognition of actions which promote the social goal of
compliance with both civil and penal statutes by making actionable
discrimination aimed at employees who refuse to violate the law.
There are plausibly three types of acts made subject to litigation
by either statute or case law that fall within this category. Termination
or other discrimination may be actionable if predicated on: a) the
employee's refusal to violate a penal or civil statute or ordinance; 94
b) the employee's lawful conduct which may prove contrary to the
employer's interests; 95 and c) the employee's action in disclosing
illegality on the part of the employer. 96 A fourth category of claims
giving rise to wrongful discharge actions may be discerned in cases
in which the activity implicates no statutory legal duty or limitation,
but instead suggests a morally offensible employer activity directed
at the employee. An example of this type of claim would involve
an employee's refusal of an employer's improper sexual advances
that results in discharge.
a. Termination based on employee's refusal to perform
an illegal act
In Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck,97 the Texas Supreme
Court recognized, for the first time in that jurisdiction, a judicially
94. An example is judicial recognition of a cause of action for wrongful discharge
by the Texas Supreme Court in Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d
733, 734-35 (Tex. 1985), where the employee was discharged for his refusal to
violate a federal statute.
95. See, e.g., Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051, 1055-
56 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding a plaintiff who suffered termination following his
apparently truthful testimony given in the course of a deposition which was adverse
to the interest of his employer did not have a viable cause of action for wrongful
discharge).
96. This theory specifically protects the employment rights of whistle-blowers
who report employer illegality. Cf. Maus v. National Living Ctrs., 633 S.W.2d
674 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
97. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
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created exception to the doctrine of at will employment based on
discharge of an employee for his refusal to perform an illegal act.
The employee in question had refused to comply with a duty of
his work that compelled him to violate federal law by pumping
bilges of the boat on which he worked into the water. 9 Prior to
his refusal to perform this duty, he had called the United States
Coast Guard to confirm a warning he had observed which advised
that such activity was illegal. The Texas court recognized that its
adoption of a limited exception to the doctrine of employment at
will followed that of twenty-two other jurisdictions" which had
applied similar limitations on employer autonomy during the preceding
thirty years.
The exception recognized by the Texas court in Hauck represents
a very narrow application of the public policy rationale for limitation
on employer autonomy. The court expressly held that the limitation
recognized under Texas law would only apply to violation of "public
policy, as expressed in the laws of Texas and the United States
which carry criminal penalties."10o Further, the court limited recovery
to those situations in which the employee is able to demonstrate
that the termination resulted solely from the refusal to violate a
criminal statute. I10 Hauck's employer had offered summary judgment
evidence that the discharge was based not upon his refusal to perform
an illegal act, but rather upon dereliction of duty in a number of
instances.102
The Hauck court's recognition of public policy as that expressed
in Texas penal statutes represents a narrow view of the doctrine. 03
Other courts, to address the problem of defining "public policy"
for purposes of wrongful discharge, have adopted broader readings
of the concept. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted
a contract-based exception to at will employment in Brockmeyer v.
Dun & Bradstreet,1°4 in which expression of public policy was
98. Id. at 734.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 735. Although the Arkansas court in Sterling Drug relied on a criminal
statute as a basis for its conclusion that a public policy of the state was violated
by the termination of a whistle blowing at will employee, the court broadly
interpreted the public policy of the state as embodied in its "constitution and
statutes." Sterling Drug, 294 Ark. at 249, 743 S.W.2d at 385 (citing Kirksey v.
City of Fort Smith, 227 Ark. 630, 300 S.W.2d 257 (1957)).
101. 687 S.W.2d at 735.
102. Id. at 734 ("Sabine testified through one of its officers that Hauck was
discharged because he refused to swab the deck, man a radio watch and other
derelictions of duty.").
103. Id. at 735.
104. 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983).
19941
UALR LAW JOURNAL
specifically limited to constitutionally or statutorily defined policy.
A more liberal approach to defining public policy, including judicial
opinions as expression of public policy, was applied by the Hawaii
Supreme Court in Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc.05
Even more expansive expressions of public policy may be noted
in the decisions of the Massachusetts °0 and New Hampshire supreme
courts, 10 7 which have made actionable employer discrimination or
retaliation merely importing "bad faith, malice or retaliatory motives."
In the New Hampshire case, Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,108 the
discharged employee had apparently failed to respond to her foreman's
sexual harassment on the job and, after having collapsed at work,
the employee was hospitalized for four days, resulting in her
termination for failure to report to work for a period of three days.
This decision illustrates the extent to which employer autonomy is
now limited both by federal regulation which would have rendered
the same conduct actionable3 9 and by evolving attitudes of state
courts away from the traditional at will employment relationship. 110
The posture adopted by the Texas court in Hauck reflects to
some extent the resistance to any broad invasion of the autonomy
of employers based upon vague or generalized public policy
considerations. Nevertheless, it serves to illustrate the type of exception,
narrowly drawn, which suggests that an erosion of the doctrine is
likely to be a long-term reality for employers and non-contractual
workers. The New Hampshire court's recognition of a "bad faith"
basis for a retaliation claim in Monge"I may well indicate a parameter
for possible judicial intervention that will enhance employee rights
because of the overlapping of remedies afforded by federal anti-
discrimination legislation and state-created remedies.
b. The public policy exception based on the
nerfnrman(-e nf lpol arts advprse tn thp emnlnvr'c
interests
A somewhat more sophisticated problem is that posed by the
discharge of an employee whose performance of a lawful or legally
105. 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982).
106. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
107. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
108. Id. at 550-51.
109. Recently, for example, the Supreme Court approved recovery for on the
job sexual harassment based on a showing that the conduct complained of would
generally be deemed inappropriate and offensive without demonstration that the
plaintiff experienced any particular psychologically traumatic injury as a result of
the harassment. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
110. Id.
111. 316 A.2d 549.
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required act is perceived as adversely affecting the interest of his
employer. An example of this type of problem is presented by the
decision of the Fifth Circuit in Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co.1 2 The employee had testified by deposition in an action in which
his testimony, allegedly truthful, was adverse to his employer.
Thereafter, he was terminated." 3 Reversing a substantial jury verdict
in his favor, the Fifth Circuit based its rejection of the plaintiff's
cause of action on its review of Texas decisions that indicated that
Texas did not recognize a public policy based exception to the
doctrine of at will employment at the time." 4
While the employer's conduct might have violated a Texas penal
statute" 5 which prohibits interference with testimony to be given by
a witness in an official proceeding, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
despite the laudable goal of encouraging truthful testimony in judicial
proceedings, Texas law would not preclude termination of an at will
employee by an employer whose interests had been compromised by
such testimony." 6
Clearly, the more liberal definitions given to the concept of
public policy by some state courts would afford a basis for an
action for retaliatory discharge by an employee situated similarly to
the discharged worker in Phillips v. Goodyear. In Ludwick v. This
Minute of Carolina, Inc.," 7 for instance, the South Carolina court
recognized a limitation on the employment at will doctrine when an
employee was fired for obeying a subpoena which required an
appearance at an official proceeding. Similary, the Oregon and
Pennsylvania courts in Nees v. Hocks"18 and Reuther v. Fowler &
Willitms, Inc., 9 respectively, recognized that strong public policy
considerations favoring compliance with a summons or notification
for jury duty justified an exception to the employment at will rule.
112. 651 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1981).
113. Id. at 1053.
114. Id. at 1055-56. In contrast, in an Eighth Circuit diversity decision pre-dating
Sterling Drug, Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984), the
court anticipated that Arkansas would adopt a wrongful discharge cause of action
based on public policy considerations. The termination occurred as a result of an
employee's refusal to engage in sexual activity with her foreman.
115. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06(a) (West 1974), which prohibits in-
terference with testimony to be given by a witness in an official proceeding.
Retaliation based upon the giving of sworn testimony in a proceeding or deposition
would appear to violate the statute.
116. 651 F.2d at 1055-56.
117. 337 S.E.2d 213, 216 (S.C. 1985).
118. 536 P.2d 512, 517 (Or. 1975).
119. 386 A.2d 119, 120 (Pa. 1978).
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By statute, Texas has limited employer autonomy to preclude
termination based on employee service in the state National Guard, 20
and for service on jury duty,"' in addition to more generalized
provisions which protect employees against discharge based on race,
religion, national origin, handicap, age, or sex, 22 or due to membership
or refusal to become a member of a trade union. 23
c. Protection of "whistle-blowers"
Not only do public policy exceptions recognize protection for
employees who refuse to violate civil or penal laws or whose
compliance with laws or exercise of rights may be perceived as
adverse to the interests of their employers, but public policy concerns
have been applied most directly to protect those employees who
report acts of wrong-doing on the part of their employers. This
broad basis for exception to the doctrine of at will employment is
perhaps the most easily understood public policy basis for exception
since it reflects the goal of protecting public, rather than private,
interests. Previously discussed theories for exceptions typically protect
the individual employee from being exposed to criminal liability or
from discrimination based upon exercise of a right or statutory
privilege personal to the employee. The whistle-blower exception, to
the contrary, truly seeks to protect the general public interest.
The Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Sterling Drug arises
from just such a whistle-blower situation. 24 The majority opinion
relied on a number of decisions from other jurisdictions in which
the whistle-blower protection had been afforded to employees who
reported acts of illegality involving their employers. 125 Oxford, the
120. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. A,,,N. art 5 , § '7a (IIs C.... 19,07) (Currently
codified at TEX. GOV'T CODE § 431.006 (West 1990)).
121. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5207b (West 1987) (currently codified at
TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 122.01 (West 1986)).
122. TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 5.01 (West 1987) (currently codified
at TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.051 (West 1994)).
123. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5207a (West 1987) (currently codified at
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 101.052 (West 1994)).
124. Sterling Drug, 294 Ark. at 242-43, 743 S.W.2d at 381-82.
125. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980) (employee
fired for insisting employer comply with food labelling and licensing laws); Harless
v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (discharge based on employee's
attempt to induce compliance with consumer credit laws); Garibaldi v. Lucky Food
Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985)
(employee allegedly fired for reporting shipment of adulterated milk to authorities
after being ordered to deliver it); McQuarry v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc.,
684 P.2d 21 (Or. 1984), rev. denied, 688 P.2d 845 (Or. 1984) (nursing supervisor's
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discharged employee in Sterling Drug, was believed to have reported
the employer to the General Services Administration for pricing
violations which resulted in a settlement of GSA's claim against the
employer in an amount in excess of one million dollars. Even though
Oxford denied having made the accusation, the employer conducted
an eighteen month campaign of harassment against him which
eventually resulted in his termination. 126
In holding that Oxford could bring an action against Sterling
Drug for the retaliatory acts which eventually resulted in his
termination, the supreme court concluded that a limited remedy
predicated on contract law would provide redress for employees who
could demonstrate that their discharge from employment resulted
from actions taken in aid of the public interest. In defining "public
interest," the court looked to the state constitution and statutes as
sources of this concept,' 27 rather than more expansive policy concerns
not previously expressed in either constitutional or statutory provisions.
The court looked to the penal statute which provides for prosecution
of an individual who retaliates "against a witness, informant, or
juror" for any act done by the subject of the retaliation in the
performance of his duties. 2 8 Based on the criminal retaliation statute,
the majority was able to conclude that "there is an established public
policy favoring citizen informants or crime fighters.' ' 29 The majority
then specifically concluded that the public policy of the state is
"contravened if an employer discharges an employee for reporting
a violation of state or federal law.' ' 30
3. The Public Policy Exception which Protects Workers'
Compensation Claimants
Within the general considerations of public policy concerns which
have served to carve exceptions from the traditional doctrine of at
claim that discharge followed report of patient abuse to authorities stated cause
of action); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981)
(firing allegedly based on employee's agreement to cooperate in investigation of
suspected criminal activity of another employee stated a cause of action); Wagner
v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250 (Ariz. 1986) (police officer's complaint stated cause
of action for wrongful discharge where he was allegedly fired for informing mag-
istrate of illegal detention of prisoner); see also Sterling Drug v. Oxford, 743
S.W.2d at 384-85.
126. 294 Ark. at 242-43, 743 S.W.2d at 381-82.
127. Supra note 100.
128. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-53-112 (Michie 1987).
129. 294 Ark. at 250, 743 S.W.2d at 386.
130. Id.
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will employment, the most specific has focused on discharge of
employees who have filed claims for workers' compensation benefits. 3 '
In Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 32 the Indiana Supreme
Court first judicially recognized a public policy based exception to
the doctrine affording discharged employees a remedy when the
employer's act in terminating results from the filing of a workers'
compensation claim. Finding that the workers' compensation statute
expressly prohibited employers from engaging in acts designed to
frustrate the purposes of the legislation, the Indiana court concluded:
"when an employee is discharged solely for exercising a statutorily
conferred right an exception to the general rule [of employment at
will] must be recognized."' 33 Despite the fact that Frampton essentially
inaugurated retaliatory discharge litigation in the workers'
compensation context less than two decades ago, a significant body
of caselaw has developed nationally demonstrating the value and
problems associated with this remedy. 3 4
The Arkansas Supreme Court recognized the decision in Frampton
in its opinion in Sterling Drug v. Oxford,'35 including the Indiana
case in a varied listing of decisions nationally which have relied on
the public policy concept as a basis for exception to the doctrine
of at will employment. 36 However, the decision technically focused
on discharges which are predicated on an express violation of public
policy as defined in Arkansas constitutional or statutory provisions.
The court did not elaborate on whether the remedy recognized in
favor of whistle-blowers would necessarily extend to other classes
of terminated employees who might claim public policy bases for
their retaliatory discharge actions, including those discharged allegedly
for filing workers' compensation claims. 137 In the subsequent decisions
131. See Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 1988). For
the most authoritative work in the area of retaliatory discharge and an excellent
survey of the developing law of this cause of action, see 2 ARTHUR LARSON, THE
LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 68.36 (1993 & Supp. 1993). Other significant
cases include Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1280, 1283-84 (Il1. 1984),
cert. denied, 472 U.S 1032 (1985); Murphy v. City of Topeka, 630 P.2d 186, 192
(Kan. Ct. App. 1981); Sventoko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1976); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 794-95 (N.D.
1984).
132. 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
133. Id. at 428.
134. Supra note 131.
135. 294 Ark. at 246, 743 S.W.2d at 384.
136. Id.
137. The court did recognize the cause of action for wrongful discharge in the
following terms: "[W]e hold that an at-will employee has a cause of action for
wrongful discharge if he or she is fired in violation of a well-established public
policy of the state." 294 Ark. at 248-49, 743 S.W.2d at 385.
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in Wal-Mart v. Baysinger38 and Mapco, Inc. v. Payne'3 the court
clearly extended the Sterling Drug concept of public policy to protect
workers' compensation claimants and approved recoveries based upon
the remedy articulated in Sterling Drug.
One troubling aspect of the Sterling Drug decision is its limitation
of the remedy to matters which involve the interest of the public.
In recognizing the public policy exception to the doctrine of
employment at will, the majority expressly held that this exception
was intended to protect only matters of interest to the public. The
majority warned: "This is a limited exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine. It is not meant to protect merely private or proprietary
interests."' 4 In so limiting the scope of the exception, the majority
referred to the Arizona Supreme Court holding in Wagner v. City
of Globe,'4' a whistle-blower case. This distinction reveals the
difference between the whistle-blower cases and those in which the
exception is based on the employee's refusal to perform illegal acts,
from public policy based exceptions to the doctrine of employment
at will which essentially focus on deprivation of a right exercised
by the individual employee. An exception based on protection of
workers' compensation claimants falls within the latter category,
even though a greater public concern may also be inferred from
violation of the rights of an individual.
The public interest served by recognition of an exception to
employment at will differs markedly from that characterizing extension
of the exception for discriminatory treatment of workers' compensation
claimants. Protection of workers who report significant wrongdoing
on the part of their employers furthers the goal of directly protecting
the important public interests which underly the prohibition of the
activity reported by the whistle-blower. Protection of compensation
claimants represents a more narrowly based public interest in terms
of the individual worker being affected by discrimination, yet the
overall viability of workers' compensation as a system of protecting
employers and workers from the consequences of injury is of
significant general interest. The "right" recognized by the Sterling
Drug court was substantially diluted by the remedy it also recognized.
138. 306 Ark. at 244-45, 812 S.W.2d at 466-67.
139. 306 Ark. at 201, 812 S.W.2d at 485.
140. 292 Ark. at 249, 743 S.W.2d at 385.
141. 722 P.2d 250 (Ariz. 1986) (discussing police officer who was wrongfully
discharged after reporting illegal detention of prisoner).
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B. The Inadequacies in the Remedy Recognized in Sterling Drug
When Applied to Discrimination Based on the Filing of
Workers' Compensation Claims by Non-contractual
Employees
Before evaluating the effectiveness of the contractual remedy
for retaliatory discharge of workers' compensation claimants, it is
important to understand that the decision in Sterling Drug raised
not only the issue of availability of a remedy in contract, but also
the possibility that a retaliation claim might be raised as a claim
of outrageous conduct in tort. 42 The Arkansas Supreme Court held,
on the facts of the case, that the employer's conduct there did not
rise to the level of outrageous conduct, 43 as that term had been
construed in recognition of the tort of outrageous conduct in the
1980 decision in M.B.M. Co. v. Counce.'" However, the majority
opinion in Sterling Drug left open the possibility that an action
might sound in tort for an employer's "outrageous" acts undertaken
in connection with the discharge of a non-ccntractual employee.' 45
The remedy in tort is examined in the next section of this article.
Regardless of the reservation of a tort-based action for retaliatory
discharge by the Sterling Drug majority, that decision made clear
that an employee claiming a retaliatory motive for discharge or other
discrimination had to look first to the "exclusive contract approach"
the Sterling Drug majority elected to apply in whistle-blower cases.
That remedy was ultimately utilized by aggrieved claimants in actions
brought in Baysinger and Payne. Those decisions do not indicate
142. 294 Ark. at 243-49, 743 S.W.2d at 382-85. For a comprehensive survey of
the development of the tort remedy for retaliatory discharge of workers' compen-
sation claimants, see Jean C. Love,e ry Di.hrge for Filing a Workers'
Compensation Claim: The Development of a Modern Tort Action, 37 HASTINGS
L.J. 551 (1986).
143. The claim of outrageous conduct was predicated on an eighteen month
program of harassment conducted by Sterling Drug through its subsidiary against
plaintiff Oxford resulting from the employer's belief that Oxford had reported the
company to the General Services Administration for pricing violations. The whistle-
blowing eventually resulted in the employer negotiating a settlement with the federal
government in excess of one million dollars. 294 Ark. at 242-45, 743 S.W.2d at
381-83.
144. 268 Ark. 269, 269, 596 S.W.2d 681, 681 (1980).
145. 294 Ark. at 243-45, 743 S.W.2d at 382. In two other Arkansas cases, the
court had concluded that the facts were sufficient to demonstrate a colorable claim
of outrage in a termination of employment situation. Tandy Corp. v. Bone, 283
Ark. 399, 678 S.W.2d 312 (1984); Hess v. Treece, 286 Ark. 434, 693 S.W.2d 792
(1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1036 (1986).
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that additional relief in tort was also pursued by the claimants,'4
as the plaintiff in Sterling Drug had sought, although unsuccessfully.
The contractual remedy should be examined in order to determine
its fairness when persued by workers who suffer discrimination as
a result of having availed themselves of the benefits of the statutory
workers' compensation scheme.
1. The Theory of "Implied Contract" Underlying the
Decision in Sterling Drug v. Oxford
In evaluating the development of wrongful discharge law
nationally, the Sterling Drug majority made a deliberate and reasoned
decision to reject a remedy for retaliation sounding in tort. 4 7 In so
doing, the majority relied on the Wisconsin decision in Brockmeyer
v. Dun & Bradstreet,'" in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court had
applied a contract-based remedy in a case involving improper
termination of a whistle-blower. The Arkansas court relied on the
rationale that a "public policy discharge action is essentially predicated
on the breach of an implied provision that an employer will not
discharge an employee for an act done in the public interest.' '4 9
The majority then concluded that a contract action is appropriate
because it provides employees a measure of protection against discharge
while limiting recovery."50
The court in Sterling Drug relied, in part, on Scholtes v. Signal
Delivery Service, Inc.,"' in which Judge Waters discerned in 1982
that Arkansas would recognize a cause of action for wrongful
discharge.5 2 Judge Waters had observed:
[W]e have no hesitancy in concluding that Arkansas law would
recognize at least four exceptions to the at-will employment
doctrine, excluding implied contracts and estoppel. These are: (1)
cases in which the employee is discharged for refusing to violate
a criminal statute; (2) cases in which the employee is discharged
for exercising a statutory right; (3) cases in which the employee
is discharged for complying with a statutory duty; and (4) cases
146. In neither Wal-Mart Stores v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463
(1991), nor Mapco, Inc. v. Payne, 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991), did an
issue concerning the continuing viability of alternative remedies in tort appear in
the opinion of the court, suggesting that counsel had elected simply to rely on the
Sterling Drug remedy for damages in contract.
147. 294 Ark. at 249, 743 S.W.2d at 385.
148. Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
149. 294 Ark. at 249, 743 S.W.2d at 385.
150. Id.
151. 548 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
152. 249 Ark. at 245, 753 S.W.2d at 383.
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in which employees are discharged in violation of the general
public policy of the state.'53
Three things are significant in Judge Waters's analysis
harmonizing the different legal doctrines involved in recognition of
the wrongful discharge action. First, the court's opinion in Scholtes
focuses on causes of action for wrongful termination based on
theories apart from "implied contract." This is interesting because
the Sterling Drug court recognized a cause of action, as predicted
by the federal courts, but deliberately grounded its remedy in the
notion of implied contract, not a remedy in tort. Second, the opinion
notes four specific categories of grievance which the court predicted
would be recognized in Arkansas law, including a general public
policy basis for the cause of action. The Sterling Drug court broke
new ground in addressing a claim which most appropriately could
be seen as arising in the type of public policy exception theory
apparently envisioned by the district court in Scholtes. Third, and
perhaps quite importantly, the reliance on Scholtes by the Sterling
Drug court suggests approval for the general principle of an expanded
remedy for terminations which implicate operation of state law.
The contract theory for recovery would at first seem to be a
logical extension of evolving Arkansas law relating to the doctrine
of "at will" employment. In 1987, the court had held that termination
without cause in violation of procedures set forth in a personnel
manual or employment agreement gives rise to an action based on
the contract which may be implied by the employee's reliance on
the statement of policy made by management in the manual or
agreement. 5 4 The majority also relied on assessments of Arkansas
law made by federal courts in Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Service,
Inc.,' and Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc.'56 In both instances, causes
of action predicated on public policy exceptions to the doctrine of
at-will employment were held to be consistent with Arkansas law.
Clearly, both pre-dated the 1988 decision in Sterling Drug, and,
almost certainly, both the district court'"7 and Eighth Circuit'58
153. 548 F. Supp. at 494.
154. Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hosp., 292 Ark. 130, 136, 728 S.W.2d
501, 505 (1988).
155. 548 F. Supp. 487, 490 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
156. 736 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (8th Cir. 1984).
157. The district court found that Arkansas would likely recognize exceptions to
the doctrine in situations both directly addressed by statutory grant of right or
prohibition and in those situations in which the discharge contravenes public policy.
Scholtes, 548 F. Supp. at 494. But in Sterling Drug, the court limited public policy
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recognized a much broader theory of Arkansas public policy than
that defined by the state supreme court in Sterling Drug.
The majority then noted that the court had previously suggested
adoption of a public policy exception in Counce'5 9 and had mentioned
the national trend in recognizing causes of action based on retaliation
in Jackson v. Kinark Corporation,16w a 1984 case. The author then
launched into a national survey of developing law, leading to the
conclusion that the decision in Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,6'
represented the soundest course of action in terms of actually approving
the new cause of action under Arkansas law.1 62
Undoubtedly, recognition of an action sounding in contract may
simply reflect the most acceptable way to reach a majority in an
considerations to those expressed in the constitution and statutes of the state. See
supra note 100.
158. Lucas, 736 F.2d at 1204-05. Sexual harassment may form the basis for an
action under federal law, but it is not clear that Arkansas law expressly precludes
retaliation based upon an employee's rejection of sexual advances made by an
employer. While economic coercion to obtain sexual services is morally improper,
it does not violate the provisions of Chapter 14 of the Criminal Code which define
sexual offenses. "Forcible compulsion" must be demonstrated to show that a rape
has been committed or attempted. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-101(2), 103 (Michie
1987). Nor would the employer's conduct satisfy the requirements for proof of the
offense of prostitution unless the employment could be termed a "fee" earned for
performance of sexual activity. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-70-102 (Michie 1987).
159. 268 Ark. 269, 273, 596 S.W.2d 681, 683 (1980). The court suggested that
the plaintiff might have stated a valid cause of action in contract if she had been
discharged for exercising a statutory right, for performing a duty required of her
by statute, or if her termination had been based on some other violation of public
policy. Id. The plaintiff had been discharged from her employment and forced to
submit to a polygraph test regarding an allegation of lost money. Id. at 271-72,
596 S.W.2d at 683. Despite the fact that she passed the test, the sum of missing
money was deducted from her final paycheck. Id. at 272, 596 S.W.2d at 683. The
Counce court declined to find that this activity violated public policy. Id. at 273,
596 S.W.2d at 683-84. While the discharge might have been supported based on
the grounds given by the employer, including the employee's bad attitude and
customer complaints, the circumstances under which the amount of her final check
was diminished should have suggested to the court that an employer's demand that
the employee take a polygraph examination followed by the employer's refusal to
act in deference to test results would violate a general public policy of fair dealing.
160. 282 Ark. 548, 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984) (holding, based on the existence of
an employee handbook affording employees a basis for a claim of procedural rights
in the termination process, that an employee's refusal to take a polygraph test in
connection with an allegation of theft of the employer's property may give rise to
a cause of action in tort).
161. 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
162. 294 Ark. at 249, 743 S.W.2d at 385 (terming Brockmeyer "pragmatic and
well reasoned").
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otherwise sharply divided-at least in terms of theory-court. 63
Nevertheless, there is little actual reasoning in the opinion
demonstrating how the notion of implied contract could be so readily
imposed on a retaliatory action based on the employee's willingness
to further the public interest. While the court's decision in Gladden
v. Arkansas Children's Hospital,'64 which recognized an implied
contract based on the employee's reliance on management's promises
not to discharge except for cause, is consistent with the notion of
a legitimate exception to at-will employment,' 65 the decision in Sterling
Drug is not. In contrast to an express promise made in an employment
manual or agreement, upon which an employee may rationally be
said to rely, no such promise is inherent in the non-contract relationship
consistent with the traditional doctrine of employment at-will. To
hold otherwise is simply to declare the concept invalid, which the
Sterling Drug court declined to do.
Because the public policy of Arkansas is expressed in the state's
constitution and statutes, as interpreted by the judiciary, one might
query whether the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Sterling
Drug fully compromises the employer's traditional autonomy by
requiring an employer to assert a cause for virtually every termination.
However, because the doctrine of employment at-will is essentially
a creation of the common law, its modification to require compliance
with constitutional and statutory guarantees appears, in a very strict
sense, less than extreme. Following Sterling Drug v. Oxford, the
doctrine differs markedly from that which employers might reasonably
have understood until the last decade. The Sterling decision may
have properly limited employer autonomy, but the court acted
inappropriately in recognizing a contract where neither employer nor
163. With two dissenting justices in Sterling Drug indicating their willingness to
dismiss Oxford's complaint and one justice dissenting based on the disposition of
both the outrage claim and remedy for wrongful discharge afforded by the majority,
the reliance on Brockmeyer may simply reflect the only basis by which Chief Justice
Holt could form a majority approving any theory of relief at all for Oxford.
164. 292 Ark. 130, 728 S.W.2d 501 (1987).
165. The exception flows from the fact that the parties have essentially modified
the terms of employment to include some restriction on employer autonomy, even
though the modification may have been unilaterally made by the employer itself
in the adoption of a policy manual, handbook, or particular representations con-
cerning the terms of employment. See Proctor v. East Cent. Ark. EOC, 291 Ark.
265, 724 S.W.2d 163 (1987) (employer's written expression of policy creates em-
ployment contract only if definite term of employment imposed); see also Youngdahl,
supra note 69, at 562-65 (summarizing theories of liability in Arkansas wrongful
discharge actions).
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employee expressly relied on matters of public policy external to the
employment relationship. For, as a result of the Sterling court's
reasoning, a tribunal can now infer an implied contract in a range
of matters that never before would have provided discharged employees
with any theory for recovery. The principle also serves to extend
contract law beyond the typical understanding of the contract as a
bargained-for agreement. If the parties are presumed to rely on
Sterling Drug's notion of public policy in the inception and
continuation of their employment relationship, then, as a matter of
contract law, nothing should prevent them from simply bargaining
away this reliance in undertaking their respective obligations in the
relationship. Of course, in a successor case, the Arkansas Supreme
Court could simply rule that the public policy of the state precludes
an agreement that disregards public policy in defining the parameters
of the employment relationship.
The problem for terminated workers' compensation claimants
posed by the Sterling Drug decision lies not so much in the theory
of implied contract adopted by the majority, but in the limited
remedy afforded by contract actions generally. In concluding that
the contract remedy was appropriate, the majority held that this
approach would strike a "fair balance" in providing employees with
"protection from employer retaliation" while concurrently limiting
recovery.'" In fact, application of a contractual remedy for workers'
compensation claimants would hardly serve to achieve a fair balance
at all and would certainly not be sufficient to provide a meaningful
deterrent against future employer discrimination toward compensation
claimants.
2. The Limitations of the Implied Contract Remedy for
Discharged Workers' Compensation Claimants
In remanding for a new trial in Sterling Drug v. Oxford, the
state supreme court discussed the measure of damages that will apply
in contract actions brought for wrongful discharge. The court noted
the difficulties in producing an accurate measure of damages in
cases in which the contract of employment has no definite term and
rejected a remedy that would have permitted a jury to estimate the
prospective wages lost by the employee based on characteristics of
166. 294 Ark. at 249, 743 S.W.2d at 385. The majority also noted that if the
employer's conduct was outrageous or extreme, the discharged worker could still
assert a tort claim for outrage. Id.
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his prior employment, such as seniority. 167 Instead, labelling that
approach as "too speculative and uncertain,"' the majority stated
the measure of damages to be applied in Arkansas actions:
We conclude that the sum of lost wages from termination until
the day of trial less the sum of any wages that the employee
actually earned or could have earned with reasonable diligence
is the general measure of damages in a public policy wrongful
discharge action. In addition, an employee can recover for any
other tangible employment benefit lost as a result of the termination.
Future damages are not recoverable. 69
This measure of damages effectively permits an employee to recover
only for actual economic loss sustained as a result of the employer's
wrongful discharge. Yet in other contexts Arkansas courts have
traditionally permitted recovery for those future economic losses that
can be supported by evidence. 70 Under the formula adopted by the
Arkansas Supreme Court, a wrongfully discharged employee may
receive an award of damages equal to the actual amount of wages
lost, reduced by any wages earned from other employment subsequent
to discharge, 7' plus the economic value of any benefits lost as a
result of the discharge. 72
167. 294 Ark. at 251, 743 S.W.2d at 386. But see Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co.
v. Smith, 637 P.2d 1020, 1025 (Wyo. 1981), (permitting recovery for future losses
based on factors such as prior service, average years of employment with the
company for all workers, and the intended period of employment for the discharged
employee). The Sterling Drug court criticized the approach taken in Panhandle.
294 Ark. at 251, 743 S.W.2d at 386. However, in Medi-Stat, Inc. v. Kusturin,
303 Ark. 45, 50, 792 S.W.2d 869, 872 (1990), the court subsequently concluded
that a parent could recover for pecuniary loss attributable to the death of a child
who might reasonably have been expected to support the parent.
168. 294 Ark. at 251, 743 S.W.2d at 386. But see Carnation Co. v. Borner,
610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980) (evaluating case in which the jury returned a verdict
on prospective loss of earnings in response to a specific inquiry); Santex, Inc. v.
Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (deciding that a loss of future
wages calculation is possible if based on an employee's earnings before termination
and lower wages after obtaining other employment).
169. 294 Ark. at 251-52, 743 S.W.2d at 386-87. This restriction on recovery of
future loss of earnings may be appropriate in the case of whistleblowers who do
not necessarily suffer loss of earning capacity as a result of discharge, but Arkansas
has traditionally recognized recovery for prospective loss of earnings for plaintiffs
who suffer personal injuries that compromise future earning capacity. See Check
v. Meredith, 243 Ark. 498, 420 S.W.2d 866 (1967).
170. Lockett v. International Paper Co., 871 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1989); Honeycutt
v. Walden, 294 Ark. 440, 743 S.W.2d 809 (1988).
171. Generally, an Arkansas plaintiff claiming economic loss must demonstrate
a good faith attempt at mitigation of damages, but the reasonableness of the effort
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The measure of damages approved by the court in a public
policy wrongful discharge action strictly limits the discharged
employee's scope of recovery. This measure of damages is inadequate
if the plaintiff is an employee discharged for filing a workers'
compensation claim-perhaps as opposed to an employee who makes
a conscious decision to report employer wrongdoing-particularly if
the employee has suffered a seriously disabling injury. In short, the
Sterling Drug remedy is insufficient as applied to workers'
compensation claimants because it fails to afford an adequate measure
of recovery for the injured employee. 171
For whistle blowers, who may rationally decide to risk employment
in order to promote the public interest, the remedy is also woefully
inadequate because the mitigation requirement serves to penalize
those employees who either conscientiously pursue other employment
or are forced to attempt other employment for economic reasons.
The employee whose sense of social responsibility compels him to
report employer illegality is punished for exactly the type of
commendable behavior that will likely compel him to diligently seek
other employment. This measure of damages may well reveal the
majority's concern that only whistle blowing undertaken for the
noblest of motives may be protected under the Sterling Drug approach.
If so, the court appears to have achieved this goal, because the
limited availability of economic recovery is certainly not likely to
induce a feeling of security for employees who consider reporting
employer illegality.
a. The contract theory fails to address the range of
discriminatory acts that violate the public policy
concerns expressed in section 11-9-107
By providing a recovery only for retaliatory discharge, the court
failed to account for non-discharge acts of discrimination. Unless
an employee is actually terminated, no loss of earnings can be
is a fact question for the jury. Western Grove School Dist. v. Strain, 288 Ark.
507, 707 S.W.2d 306 (1986).
172. 294 Ark. at 251-52, 743 S.W.2d at 386-87. This measure of damages has
been criticized as demonstrating to at-will employees that "all that glitters is not
gold," because the remedy is inadequate to prevent employer illegality or compensate
the discharged employee.
173. In contrast, in Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 453-54 (Tex.
1980), the Texas Supreme Court held that recovery for loss of wages and benefits
in the future are properly recoverable in an action for wrongful discharge of an
employee fired in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim.
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recovered under Sterling Drug.7 4 However, the prohibitions imposed
by both the former and amended versions of section 11-9-107 include
not only discharge in retaliation for the filing of a claim for benefits,
but also acts of discrimination with respect to hiring or in setting
the terms or conditions of work.' 7 In Mapco, Inc. v. Payne,'76 the
court recognized a right to recovery in a "refusal to rehire" context,
rather than in the typical termination setting.' 77 The jury assessed
damages and the court affirmed the verdict. In the discriminatory
non-hiring context, the same measure of damages can be employed
as that recognized in Sterling Drug: the jury could simply compute,
from the date of the refusal to hire to the date of the trial, the
total earnings lost as a result of discrimination. However, other
forms of discrimination, such as reassignment or imposition of more
restrictive working conditions, are not so readily susceptible to an
acceptable calculation of precise amounts of compensable lost wages.
Yet, the public policy relied on by the court in Sterling Drug and
subsequently in Wal-Mart v. Baysinger and Mapco, Inc. v. Payne
clearly incorporates discriminatory behavior other than termination
or refusal to hire. That policy would additionally appear to require
some measure of economic recovery consistent with the Sterling Drug
holding.
Two major concerns face workers' compensation claimants who
are potentially subjected to retaliation from employers. First, claimants
face the possibility of discrimination in employment based on their
prior history of work-related injury and compensation claims. For
an employer concerned about insurance premiums or costs of litigation,
including very legitimate concerns about bad faith claims, the initial
employment application may well provide the easiest way to attempt
to avoid claims or litigation. 78 If a prospective employee has an
admitted history of either injury or claims, the employer may be
174. The opinion specifically addresses the damage issue in terms of discharge
and does not offer any remedy for other acts of discrimination such as demotion,
reassignment, or forfeiture of seniority. 294 Ark. at 250, 743 S.W.2d at 386.
However, the opinion does recognize that these other forms of discrimination might
support a claim for constructive discharge when they result in conditions so in-
tolerable that the employee is forced to resign. Id. (citing Harris v. Wal-Mart, 658
F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Ark. 1987)).
175. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
176. 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991).
177. Id. at 201, 812 S.W.2d at 485.
178. An employer could defend an action based on a good faith concern that
the prospective employee might have brought frivolous compensation claims in the
past, for instance.
[Vol. 16:373
WORKERS COMPENSATION
induced not to hire based upon: 1) the perception that the employee
is more likely to sustain additional injuries or aggravate pre-
employment conditions or injuries; 2) a presumption that the
employee's understanding of workers' compensation law demonstrates
a willingness to pursue statutory claims for benefits; or 3) the concern
that the employee, once hired, may be more difficult to fire because
of the protections afforded by the trend in the law toward less
employer autonomy in termination decisions.
Section 11-9-107 expressly prohibits employer discrimination in
the hiring process based on the prospective employee's history of
claiming benefits under the Act. 79 The provision does not, however,
expressly prohibit reliance on the history of work-related injury as
a factor the prospective employer might consider in making the
hiring decision. Unless the application form specifically addresses
the issue of prior claims, as opposed to injuries or limitations on
physical activity, it would be quite difficult for a prospective employee
to meet the burden, required by section 11-9-107, of showing that
the employer "willfully discriminate[d]"' 80 in failing to hire based
on the applicant's history of claiming benefits.' 8'
Even if the job applicant could show that the refusal to hire
was predicated on discrimination proscribed by section 11-9-107, the
179. Other jurisdictions have attempted to impose similar protections in the hiring
process. See OR. REV. STAT. § 659.410 (Supp. 1994); Morehouse v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Bd., 201 Cal. Rptr. 154 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (concluding
that an employer's refusal to rehire a recovered employee is actionable). However,
in Smith v. Coffee's Shop for Boys & Men, 536 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976), the court impliedly determined that the Texas statute applicable to workers'
compensation claimants would not expressly proscribe discrimination in the hiring
decision based on the applicant's prior reliance on the Act to seek or secure benefits
for a work-related injury or condition.
180. Apic. CODE ANN. § 1l-9-107(a)(l) (Michie Supp. 1993).
181. Presumably, any reason advanced by an employer for not hiring an applicant
with a prior history of compensation claims or compensable injuries, other than
the applicant's prior experience with the compensation system, would serve to avoid
criminal liability under § 11-9-107, whether offered in good faith or merely as a
pretext. If an employer were able to offer any legitimate alternative reason for the
refusal to hire, then the claimant would face a difficult burden in establishing his
claim. However, if the employer refused to hire after communicating with a prior
employer against whom the prospective employee had filed a claim, the applicant
might show circumstantially that this was the basis for the unfavorable decision
on his application. For instance, in VanTran Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 708 S.W.2d
527, 530 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), the injured employee's supervisor called a company
with whom the worker subsequently sought employment to tell its hiring officer
that the employee had suffered a totally disabling back injury and had also filed
a lawsuit against the supervisor's company. In such a situation, the aggrieved
applicant might be able to demonstrate circumstantially that a decision not to hire
was discriminatory and in violation of the workers' compensation law.
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issue of the measure of damages available under Sterling Drug would
materialize. Because the employee was not hired, the only appropriate
measure of damages would be the sum of wages that would have
been earned from the date of refusal to hire until the date of trial.
Any other formulation would fail to meet the majority's objection
to speculation in future damages. More significantly, the difficulty
in proving the employer's motive, absent a virtual admission of
discriminatory intent, would probably bar recovery as a practical
matter, if not as a matter of law. 82
Second, the Sterling Drug remedy fails to account for other
forms of employer discrimination, such as reassignment, that might
flow from a claim for benefits. Refusing to work will often be
difficult or impossible for an injured employee who must assume
the same position or perform the same duties as required prior to
the injury. Similarly, reassignment of the employee to new duties
may drastically impair performance and thus afford the discriminating
employer a "protected" basis for ultimately terminating the employee
based on inability to perform the duties required of the position.
Section 11-9-107 does not purport to prevent an employer from
terminating an employee whose injury makes return to work
impossible, or from providing a replacement for an employee whose
lengthy absence from the job compromises production.
While the majority in Sterling Drug did expressly recognize as
accurate the decision in Harris v. Wal-Mart,'83 in which the District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas had held that a
"constructive discharge" occurs when the employer makes working
conditions so unsatisfactory as to cause resignation,' 8 ' that decision
may not be applicable to employees forced to suffer unsatisfactory
working conditions because economic necessity compels them to
continue their employment." 5 Moreover, a change in working
182. This is particularly true when the employer can legitimately predicate a
decision not to hire on its concern that a prior injury may demonstrate the employee's
inability to physically perform the task of the desired employment. See, e.g., Elzey
v. Forrest, 739 P.2d 99 (Okla. 1987) (deciding that an employer may terminate an
employee who is unable to perform duties of employment).
183. 658 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Ark. 1987).
184. Id. at 70-7 1.
185. The court in Sterling Drug adopted a formula that measures damages by
computing lost wages that accrue from the date of discharge until the day of trial.
294 Ark. at 251-52, 743 S.W.2d at 386-87 (citing Seaman Stores v. Porter, 180
Ark. 860, 23 S.W.2d 249 (1930)). Consequently, in the absence of an actual discharge
or other termination that may be appropriately characterized as a "contructive
discharge," the employee would have no way of demonstrating any starting point
for the accrual of loss of wages.
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conditions that does not directly suggest harassment, but that could
legitimately relate to different training, skills, or physical capabilities
may not prove so onerous as to justify resignation.
No measure of damages suggested by the court in Sterling Drug
will appropriately reflect the type of injury sustained by an employee
who is neither fired nor subjected to a reduction in wages, but
rather experiences discriminatory changes in working conditions.
Consequently, no remedy in contract could compensate an employee
suffering this type of discrimination because there would be no wage
differential that could be calculated by the jury in response to a
special interrogatory founded on the contract theory.8 6 For non-
termination cases, the remedy imposed in Sterling Drug would simply
prove inadequate for employees suffering discrimination because of
their claims for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act.
b. The contract theory fails to provide a complete
remedy for discharged employees
The measure of damages approved by the Sterling Drug majority
fails to afford many injured workers a complete remedy for the
discrimination they have suffered. While the decision does permit
recovery of lost wages through the date of trial, 8 7 as well as the
economic value of benefits associated with employment,'8 the majority
position denied two critical bases for recovery.
First, the Sterling Drug majority's hesitance to permit recovery
for future loss of wages on the theory that these types of damages
are too speculative severely limits a discharged employee who also
has sustained a work-related injury. The fact of the injury itself
may preclude the employee from ever again fully realizing his
employment potential in light of the possible difficulty in obtaining
another position once the employee discloses the prior injury on an
employment application. 89 Even though the employee may recover
substantial benefits under the workers' compensation law for a total
and permanent incapacity, 90 this measure of recovery is not designed
186. See 294 Ark. at 251-52, 743 S.W.2d at 386-87.
187. 294 Ark. at 251-52, 743 S.W.2d at 386-87.
188. Id. at 252, 743 S.W.2d at 387. The benefit must be a "tangible employment
benefit." Id.
189. This is particularly true in light of the right of Arkansas employers to
inquire about prior injuries and compensation on pre-employment applications. See
supra note 37. For a comprehensive discussion of the impact of the federal Americans
with Disabilities Act on Arkansas employment practices, see Oliver, supra note 65.
190. Benefits for a nonpermanent incapacitating injury are limited to a maximum
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to fully support an employee indefinitely.' 91 Consequently, the injured
and discharged employee faces the very real prospect that his recovery
will be limited to wages lost between the date of discharge and the
date of trial, 92 despite the fact the he may not be able to gain
other employment.
By comparison, the limitation on recovery of future lost wages
may not prove so onerous for an employee who is discharged in
retaliation for his action in reporting illegality on the part of the
employer. The "whistle-blower" makes a conscious decision to report
the illegality, and he may elect not to do so if he cannot rationally
bear the loss of his job. 193 Moreover, even if the loss of the job
poses severe consequences, the whistle-blower typically has not
sustained an incapacitating injury that could limit his ability to
perform tasks required for other employment. Nor has the whistle-
blower engaged in an activity that may threaten economic consequences
for a prospective employer concerned about workers' compensation
premiums,'9 even though the prospective employer may elect not to
hire based on the whistle-blower's evidenced zeal in reporting his
prior employer's illegal activity.
In addition to placing a limitation on the recovery of future
lost wages, the Sterling Drug opinion may limit the recovery of the
economic value of benefits associated with employment. For example,
how should a fact-finder compute the value of discontinuation of
weekly payment of 70076 of the average weekly wage in the state. ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 11-9-501(b)(3) (Michie Supp. 1993). Even in the case of permanent total disability,
weekly benefits are limited to two-thirds of the worker's average weekly wage.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-519(a) (Michie Supp. 1993).
191. Disability not amounting to permanent disability, regardless of severity,
entitles the injured employee to benefits payable for a maximum period of 450
weeks. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-502(a) (Michie 1987).
192. See supra note 166 and accompanying text
193. In fact, Oxford, the discharged employee in Sterling Drug, denied that he
was the whistle-blower who had reported Sterling Drug's pricing violations to the
General Services Administration. 294 Ark. at 243, 743 S.W.2d at 382. If deterrence
is the rationale underlying recognition of the remedy, then imposition of punitive
damages is certainly the remedy most likely to achieve the goal. See Vigil v. Arzola,
699 P.2d 613, 621 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), overruled by Chavez v. Manville Prods.
Corp., 777 P.2d 371 (N.M. 1989); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d at 353
(I1. 1978). That potential whistle blowers might be discouraged from making
disclosures in the public interest by the threat of loss of employment is obvious
and has been recognized. See John H. Conway, Protecting the Private Sector At-
Will Employee Who "Blows the Whistle": A Cause of Action Based Upon De-
terminants of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 777 (1977).
194. See Hunt v. Van Der Horst Corp., 711 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986) (determining that an employer's admission of concern over rising workers'
compensation insurance premiums may be used as evidence of retaliatory motive,
despite alternative inference that the statement demonstrated concern for legitimate
business concerns, including worker safety).
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the employee's participation in a pension program, particularly one
that has already vested or is near to vesting? Certainly, it is possible
to calculate the economic value of immediate benefits, such as accrued
vacation leave or sick leave that an employee may take in monetary
compensation if not used. But participation in retirement programs
is more difficult to value for precisely the same reasons that the
Sterling Drug majority relied upon in rejecting recovery for future
loss of wages.1 95 Recognizing that other courts had relied on factors
such as the length of employment, average tenure of employees with
the company, and the employee's own expression of intention to
stay with the company, the supreme court nevertheless concluded
that these factors were not sufficiently precise to enable fact-finding
free from speculation and rejected recovery based on that combination
of circumstantial evidence and direct testimony by the interested
plaintiff.'9 Yet these same assumptions must be made in computing
the long-term economic value of the employee's participation in
retirement or stock option benefit programs that might be available
as a feature of the employment. Consequently, the discharged
employees may lose some amount of the real value of lost benefits
simply because calculation of the value of these benefits will prove
too speculative to satisfy the stringent test for recovery set in Sterling
Drug.
Second, the reliance on the contract remedy deprives the
discharged worker of any claim involving one type of recovery that
normally is available in tort actions: damages for the psychic injury
suffered by the plaintiff. 97 The terminated employee may well suffer
extreme anxiety as a loss of employment, particularly where the
discharge follows a lengthy employment relationship or demonstrates
significant vindictiveness in light of the employee's record of service
to the enterprise. In addition, the contract remedy fails to recognize
damages that may flow from stress in the worker's personal life
195. By precluding the recovery of future damages, the opinion suggests that
the "tangible" employment benefit which might be recovered would be the current
value of the employee's interest in the retirement plan. See 294 Ark. at 252, 743
S.W.2d at 387. However, under the court's formulation an unresolved question
would be whether the current value of plan participation would be the value on
the date of termination or the value on the day of trial.
196. 294 Ark. at 251, 743 S.W.2d at 386.
197. In Niblo v. Parr Mfg., Inc., 445 N.W.2d 351, 353-57 (Iowa 1989), the
Iowa Supreme Court held, based on the underlying theory of the tort as an
intentional, rather than merely negligent, act, that an employers retaliatory discharge
of a workers' compensation claimant properly gives rise to damages for emotional
distress.
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that is induced by the loss of employment. 98 For instance, increased
instability within the employee's family or marriage that is attributable
to the loss of income or the stabilizing influence of regular work
hours may be significant, but nonetheless non-compensable under
Sterling Drug.199 Closely paralleling the lost opportunity for recovery
of damages suffered because of psychic injuries associated with the
termination is the inability to recover punitive damages designed to
punish the employer's illegal acts. The Sterling Drug majority, in
striving for a remedy that would balance the interests of the parties,
essentially sacrificed the single most significant deterrent available
to prevent future employer illegality by adopting a contract remedy
which makes no provision for assessment of exemplary damages.
These damages would not only provide the desired deterrent against
future retaliatory conduct, but also offer a source of vindication
for the loss of the employee's legal right to seek workers' compensation
benefits for injuries sustained on the job.2w
c. The requirement for mitigation of damages serves to
restrict the availability of the contract remedy for
many workers
The contract formulation for recovery recognized by the Sterling
Drug majority fails to afford protection for the class of unskilled
or low-skilled workers that is most likely to be subject to discriminatory
discharge. Highly skilled or unionized workers are more likely to
198. For instance, the Sterling Drug court noted that the employee claimed that,
prior to his discharge, his life had already been subjected to considerable stress
from a recent divorce and that the employer was aware of this stress while pursuing
its pattern of harassment against him. 294 Ark. at 244, 743 S.W.2d at 382-83.
The employee relied on these facts in asserting that Sterling Drug's conduct in the
matter was "outrageous." J . Nevertheless, the court rejected recovery under this
theory. Id. at 244-45, 743 S.W.2d at 383.
199. 294 Ark. at 251, 743 S.W.2d at 386 (limiting recovery of damages to lost
wages). This approach was severely criticized by Justice Purtle, dissenting, who
observed: "The conduct by the employer in this case caused the appellee embar-
rassment, humiliation, physical and mental problems, and severe financial losses.
None of these elements of damages are recoverable under the majority decision."
Id. at 254-A, 743 S.W.2d at 388. In his dissent from the per curiam order denying
rehearing, Justice Purtle continued his attack on the court's adoption of purely
contractual damages. 294 Ark. 239, 254-A to 254-D, 747 S.W.2d 579, 579-80 (1988)
(per curiam). Justice Dudley indicated that he would have granted rehearing, but
did not join Purtle's scathing dissent. Id. at 254-A, 747 S.W.2d at 579.
200. For example, in Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 734 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1987)
the jury awarded plaintiff Caille $167,464 in actual damages for lost wages and
insurance benefits and $175,000 in punitive damages. This award was upheld on
direct appeal, Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 720 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), and
on review by the Texas Supreme Court. 734 S.W.2d at 668-69.
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be protected against the effects of employer discrimination by their
ability to obtain other employment or through the protection afforded
by collective bargaining agreements. For employees at the lower end
of the skills spectrum who are not protected by collective bargaining
agreements, the loss of wages formulation presents substantial
problems in terms of a suitable remedy.
First, the potential recovery in wrongful discharge actions,
predicated on lost wages from the date of termination until trial,
may be insubstantial. Recovery potential in the range of $15,000 to
$25,000 for a worker employed at or near minimum wage may hardly
be expected to excite interest from plaintiffs' lawyers providing
services under a contingent fee contract, 20 l even though the preparation
and conduct of the trial might not be complicated or expensive.
Second, availability of attorneys' fees under the newly adopted
statutory provision, 20 2 which might make wrongful discharge litigation
more attractive, does not ensure ready access to representation because
the likelihood of recovery in contract may not be favorable in the
typical termination case. This is true because the employer may
defeat the claim simply by offering a reasonable, credible explanation
for the termination as an alternative to the employee's allegation
that she was discharged because of a claim for workers' compensation
benefits. While the greater potential for recovery in tort would likely
induce settlement in cases in which the employee's claim for relief
is admitted by the employer, the limited recovery potential of the
contract action may make it more feasible for the employer to resist
reasonable settlement demands and proceed to trial. Moreover, the
contract action might serve to limit the admissibility of evidence
extraneous to the employment relationship that could have a bearing
on the plaintiff's ability to prove the claim.
Third, the requirement for mitigation of damages impacts severely
on the first two considerations by reducing both the potential for
recovery and the reasonableness of attorneys' fees. Employees already
201. Nevertheless, the published opinions in Wal-Mart v. Baysinger and Mapco
Inc. v. Payne demonstrate the plaintiffs' counsel have been willing to pursue even
the limited remedies available under the Sterling Drug damages formula. In Bay-
singer, the jury returned a verdict for $24,000. Wal-Mart v. Baysinger, 306 Ark.
239, 241, 812 S.W.2d 463, 464 (1991). The jury verdict in Payne was for $15,000.
Mapco Inc. v. Payne, 306 Ark. 198, 199, 812 S.W.2d 483, 484 (1991). Whether
this level of recovery will support litigation in cases other than test cases, however,
remains to be seen. The General Assembly's adoption of exclusive administrative
and criminal remedies in Act 796 may preclude the development of additional
caselaw that would provide a basis for discerning whether the recovery available
under Sterling Drug is adequate to justify litigation.
202. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107(b) (Michie Supp. 1993).
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earning low wages are unlikely to be able to avoid re-employment,
when available, because of the whip of economic necessity. The
reduction in an already small loss of wages by other wages earned
can only serve to limit the attractiveness to the terminated employee
and her counsel of pursuing a claim against the offending employer.
Even with the potential for full compensation of counsel through
an attorneys' fee award, the attractiveness of the litigation and,
thus, the potential vindication of the client's interests, may be rendered
so economically insignificant as to induce the client not to take
action. The consequence to an individual worker who has otherwise
always experienced job insecurity may actually not be serious, but
the overall impact on the system can only be to encourage employers
to engage in vindictive or retaliatory conduct toward non-contractual
workers who are injured during the course of their employment and
apply for workers' compensation benefits.
Ill. THE FEASIBILITY OF THE TORT REMEDY FOR WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE
The General Assembly's express language nullifying the decisions
in Wal-Mart v. Baysinger and Mapco, Inc. v. Payne,203 might be
left undisturbed by Arkansas courts reviewing constitutional chal-
lenges to the provisions of Act 796. If that is the case, workers'
compensation claimants suffering discrimination would theoretically
be limited to those remedies adopted by the General Assembly.
However, the courts might hold that tort remedies for an employer's
retaliatory discrimination are not affected by the provision of Act
796.2° Applying a rule of strict construction to the Act, as dictated
by the General Assembly, 25 would require Arkansas courts to hold
that the nullification of those decisions applying Sterling Drug to
discharged workers' compensation claimants has effectively elimi-
nated the implied contract theory of recovery for wrongful discharge.
As a consequence of the application of a strict reading of the
Act, tort remedies for employer illegality would remain intact and
203. Id. § 11-9-107(e).
204. Although the General Assembly expressly sought to avoid the appearance
of abridging the doctrine of "employment at will," ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107(d)
(Michie Supp. 1993), continued application of tort remedies for outrageous conduct
would not constitute an exception to that doctrine. Instead of holding that the
employer's autonomy is limited by the "implied contract" recognized by the court
in Sterling Drug, the application of tort remedies would simply redress illegal
discrimination in the treatment of an injured worker seeking to avail herself of
the benefits of the compensation system.
205. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-1001 (Michie Supp. 1993) (calling for strict
application of the Act's provisions by Arkansas appellate courts).
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available to aggrieved compensation claimants. Nothing in the Act
expressly addressed other judicial decisions that had recognized a
tort recovery, particularly one based on the theory of outrage, as
potentially available for employees subjected to illegal discrimination.
The implications for the continued viability of a tort-based remedy
for discrimination directed toward employees claiming workers' com-
pensation benefits will be particularly important if the appellate
courts reject a constitutional challenge aimed at the General Assem-
bly's attempt to insulate the doctrine of at-will employment by
nullifying prior decisions that recognize an exception to this general
principle for aggrieved compensation claimants.
Historically, the development of the remedy for wrongful dis-
charge of workers' compensation claimants has involved actions
sounding in tort rather than contract. 206 While the Arkansas Supreme
Court elected in Sterling Drug to recognize a remedy that is predicated
on the theory of implied contract and couches recovery in terms of
traditional contract damages, an overwhelming majority of juris-
dictions have, either by judicial decision or legislative enactment,
grounded the remedy in tort.20 7 Prior to the court's recognition of
the contract-based cause of action in Sterling Drug, however, a
number of Arkansas decisions focusing on employer misconduct in
terminating or retaliating against employees had arisen in tort con-
texts, particularly in the development of the tort of outrage.108 This
section examines outrage and tort recovery generally as an alternative
remedy for those compensation claimants who experience employer
discrimination.
The expanded potential for recovery in tort actions, when con-
trasted with the limited measure of damages available for recovery
in contract, represents a significant improvement in the compensation
available for employees discharged in retaliation for having filed
claims for workers' compensation benefits. For example, the range
of available damages is far more expansive in most tort actions than
those damages recognized by the Sterling Drug court as sounding
206. For a comprehensive national survey of the development of the wrongful
discharge remedy in tort, see Jean C. Love, Retaliatory Discharge for Filing a
Workers' Compensation Claim: The Development of a Modern Tort Action, 37
HASTINGS L.J. 551 (1986).
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., Givens v. Hixson, 275 Ark. 370, 371-72, 631 S.W.2d 263, 264(1982) (finding allegation of employer's anger during discharge insufficient to state
claim for outrage, particularly where plaintiff admitted that employer had not been
made aware of plaintiff's heart condition and daily medication).
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in contract, for tort damages may include recovery for future lost
wages209 and emotional distress. 10 Moreover, the intentional nature
of any tort applicable to cases involving wrongful discharge indicates
the appropriateness of punitive damage awards to deter future em-
ployer misconduct. 21
The discharged employee in Sterling Drug brought his action
for wrongful discharge both in tort and contract, basing the tort
action on the relatively new Arkansas remedy for outrageous con-
duct.212 The majority rejected the claim for damages in tort, finding
the conduct of the employer not to be sufficiently outrageous to
justify recovery under that theory of relief. 2 3 Nevertheless, the ma-
209. See, e.g., Egg City of Ark., Inc. v. Rushing, 304 Ark. 562, 803 S.W.2d
920 (1991) (upholding recovery for lost past and future earnings of $340,000 in
automobile accident case).
210. In Deitsch v. Tillery, 309 Ark. 401, 833 S.W.2d 760 (1992), the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that a complaint alleging mental distress for outrageous conduct
committed by school officials who failed to follow required procedures for removal
of asbestos from a school and misrepresented the condition to induce the continued
attendance and participation of the school's students and employees stated a cause
of action. Other jurisdictions have permitted recovery of damages for emotional
distress for employees wrongfully terminated. Niblo v. Parr Mfg., Inc., 445 N.W.2d
351, 355-56 (Iowa 1989) (citing decisions arising under the wrongful discharge tort
law of West Virginia, Oklahoma, Michigan, Indiana, Minnesota, Oregon, Virginia,
and Washington).
211. See, e.g., Bruns v. Bruns, 290 Ark. 347, 719 S.W.2d 691 (1986) (concluding
that punitive damages are recoverable for an intentional violation of another's
rights); Brown v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 703 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding
Arkansas authorizes punitive damages to deter defendant from simply assuming
costs of litigation and refusing to take appropriate measures to remedy defective
condition); see also Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 734 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1987)
(upholding award of punitive damages in wrongful firing of workers' compensation
claimant).
212. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 242, 743 S.W.2d 380, 381(1988). The leading Arkansas decision on "tort of outrage" is M.B.M. Co. v.
Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
213. 294 Ark. at 244-45, 743 S.W.2d at 383. The factual claim for outrage in
M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 271, 596 S.W.2d 681, 682 (1980), was based
on the defendant's termination of the plaintiff's employment and subsequent de-
duction from the plaintiff's final check of money that the employer claimed was
missing from the store at the time of the discharge. The plaintiff was forced to
take a polygraph examination, but even after being told that she passed the test
the manager of the store withheld the disputed money. Id. at 271-72, 596 S.W.2d
at 683. Although the court declined to find that the plaintiff's termination constituted
outrageous conduct or that she had suffered extreme emotional distress, it nev-
ertheless reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further pro-
ceedings on the issue of whether the employer's conduct in withholding the disputed
money constituted outrageous conduct. 268 Ark. at 280-81, 596 S.W.2d at 687-
88.
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jority did not foreclose an action for outrage in wrongful discharge
cases, observing: "If an employer's conduct in breaching a contract
of employment is sufficiently egregious or extreme, the employee
can still claim tort damages on a cause of action for outrage.
21 4
This observation is grounded in the notion that an implied
contract of employment may be found where the discharge is based
on the employer's vindictiveness in punishing the employee for an
act done in furtherance of the public interest. 215 Thus, the court
appears to have concluded that the act of retaliation itself warrants
recovery for breach of the implied employment contract, while the
employer's additional behavior incident to the retaliatory act might
itself be so egregious as to warrant an additional remedy for out-
rage. 2
16
Because the court has left intact the possibility that an action
for wrongful discharge may be argued in terms of outrageous con-
duct, that tort theory, as characterized by Arkansas decisions, must
be scrutinized to determine whether it affords discharged employees
adequate recourse against retaliating employers. In addition, dis-
cussion of an alternative theory of recovery may disclose another
approach to wrongful discharge cases which will prove more suc-
cessful in individual cases.
A. The Tort of "Outrage" in Arkansas
The Arkansas Supreme Court first recognized a remedy for
infliction of emotional distress in M.B.M. Company v. Counce,2
17
214. 294 Ark. at 249, 743 S.W.2d at 385.
215. The public interest aspect of the firing is critical for proof of wrongful
discharge under Arkansas law, although not necessarily for proof of outrage. Thus,
in Smith v. American Greetings Corp., 304 Ark. 596, 599, 804 S.W.2d 683, 685
(1991), the court rejected the argument that termination based on the employee's
engaging in a fight with his shift supervisor constituted a wrongful discharge, as
the claim involved mere vindication of a private interest.
216. The Sterling Drug court offered no example of employer behavior that
might be so egregious as to warrant an additional recovery in tort. One example
of such behavior might be an employer who not only retaliates by discharging the
worker claiming compensation benefits, but who also attempts to influence other
prospective employers not to hire the discharged employee. See VanTran Elec.
Corp. v. Thomas, 708 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (discharging employer
telephoned subsequent employer to inform him of employee's back injury and total
disability).
217. 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
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a 1980 decision in which the court characterized this theory of
recovery as the "tort of outrage. ' 21 8 Counce arose in the context
of the discharge of a non-contractual employee, and, perhaps
significantly, the subsequent history of this theory of recovery is
most dramatically reflected in actions based on the employment
relationship of non-contractual employees.
In Counce, the employee was terminated after her employer
discovered checks and money missing from the counter where she
had worked the preceding night. 2 9 The employee submitted to a
polygraph examination, at the employer's demand, but the employer
did not subsequently reinstate her and also withheld remuneration
from her final paycheck. 220 Then, the employer responded to the
employee's application for unemployment compensation by stating
that she had been terminated due to customer complaints and because
of her failure to follow company policy. 221 The supreme court, in
reversing the summary judgment entered by the trial court, found
that the circumstances of the case were sufficient to raise a fact
issue as to whether the employer's behavior constituted extreme and
outrageous conduct. 222
Although the court in Counce addressed the possibility of
recognizing a cause of action expressly designed to redress wrongful
discharge, 223 the supreme court ultimately rested its holding on the
narrow remedy of outrage.2 24 At first blush, the court's willingness
to consider the adoption of a cause of action for wrongful discharge
might appear to have offered great promise for the development of
a remedy expressly designed to protect workers' compensation
claimants from unjustified termination. Five years later, however,
the court held in Harris v. Arkansas Book Company,225 that the
mere discharge of an at will employee is not, in itself, sufficiently
extreme and outrageous as to be actionable under the tort of outrage. 226
218. Id. at 280, 596 S.W.2d at 687.
219. Id. at 271, 596 S.W.2d at 683.
220. Id. at 271-72, 596 S.W.2d at 683.
221. Id. at 272, 596 S.W.2d at 683.
222. Id. at 281, 596 S.W.2d at 688.
223. In fact, the Counce court expressly rejected any general exception to the
doctrine of "at-will" employment, but recognized that an exception might be found
if the discharge occurred because the employee "exercis[ed] a statutory right, or
... perform[ed] a duty required of her by law, or ... [if] the reason for the
discharge was in violation of some other well established public policy." Id. at
273, 596 S.W.2d at 683.
224. 268 Ark. at 280, 596 S.W.2d at 687-88.
225. 287 Ark. 353, 700 S.W.2d 41 (1985).
226. Id. at 357, 700 S.W.2d at 43. ("A supposed breach of vague assurance of
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A survey of outrage cases that have arisen in the employment
context demonstrates two significant undecided issues which pose
questions for the utility of that tort as a vehicle to protect workers'
compensation claimants.
1. Outrageous Conduct Generally
If Counce and Harris define the parameters of the tort of
outrage in employment relations cases, then the issue of the remedy
available for a terminated workers' compensation claimant may be
cast in terms of the egregiousness of the employer's conduct in
terminating the employee.127 Clearly, the Sterling Drug court affirmed
that sufficiently extreme or outrageous conduct on the part of the
employer will, in addition to the remedy in contract made available
in that decision, still support an action in outrage. 228
The decisions on outrage rendered subsequent to Counce
regrettably do not provide a ready understanding of the nature of
conduct that will support a tort claim for wrongful discharge. For
instance, the pattern of harassment demonstrated in Sterling Drug
itself, ultimately leading to the forced resignation of Oxford, was
not deemed sufficient to state a claim for relief in outrage. 229 In
two other decisions, though, the court concluded that the evidence
of the employer's misconduct was sufficient to support a claim for
relief for outrage.
The employer in Tandy Corporation v. Bone,230 a 1984 decision,
accused the employee of theft and interrogated him for an extended
period in a stressful environment. The employer then denied the
long term employment does not constitute the tort of outrage. Surely, most employers
express hope that newly hired employees will enjoy a long career with them, but
those employers hardly intend for their sentiments to form a contract with the
employee. Similirly, the supposed breach of an undefined pension plan does not
constitute the tort of outrage.").
227. It is important to remember that a claim for wrongful discharge may suggest
recovery for outrage, but not necessarily so. Under Arkansas law, all improper
discharges simply do not qualify as outrageous acts on the part of the employers.
Webb v. HCA Health Services of Midwest, Inc., 300 Ark. 613, 617-18, 780 S.W.2d
571, 573 (1981).
228. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 244-45, 743 S.W.2d 380,
382-83 (1988).
229. Id. at 244, 743 S.W.2d at 383. Indeed, in Givens v. Hixson, 275 Ark. 370,
631 S.W.2d 263 (1982), the court had observed that the concept of outrage was
"new and still developing" and that the claim required "clear-cut proof."
230. 283 Ark. 399, 678 S.W.2d 312 (1984). The opinion suggests that the critical
fact in determining that the plaintiff had stated a claim for outrage was the fact
that the employer knew about plaintiff's medical condition and need for valium
at the time it refused to permit plaintiff access to the prescription drug. Id. at
316-17.
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employee access to his prescription medication, valium, which had
been prescribed to relieve the worker's stress. In Hess v. Treece,231
a case decided the following year, the court considered an on going
dispute between a Little Rock police officer and city director over
a personal matter. The conflict escalated into a two-year pattern of
harassment by the director of the officer which included surveillance,
communication of threats to have the officer terminated, and the
making of false reports relating to the officer's performance. In
both cases, the court found that the pattern of conduct on the part
of the employer was sufficiently egregious to provide a basis for a
claim of damages in outrage.
However, in Ingram v. Pirelli Cable Corporation,23 2 the court
rejected a claim of outrage predicated on a lengthy period of employer
harassment which eventually resulted in a de facto termination of
plaintiff's employment. The majority characterized management's
conduct as "petty, insulting and less than one might expect from
manager level executives of a reputable firm, ' 233 but, nevertheless,
concluded that the conduct did not rise to the requisite level of
outrageousness to afford the employee a remedy in tort. The majority
distinguished the facts from those in Counce and Bone, rejecting
application of the remedy for conduct which essentially consists of
"mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or
other trivialities.' '234
Dissenting, Justices Dudley and Purtle found the majority's
attempt to distinguish the facts in Ingram from those demonstrated
in Counce unpersuasive, 235 given the extended period of harassment
the plaintiff had suffered and his testimony concerning the nature
of the anxiety he had suffered as a consequence of his employer's
conduct. The dissenters would have held the evidence sufficient to
demonstrate an unresolved issue of fact requiring determination by
the jury,236 whereas, on less egregious facts, the Counce court reversed
the summary judgment and remanded the case for trial. 237
Ingram does follow, in principle, the decision in White v. Apollo-
231. 286 Ark. 434, 693 S.W.2d 792 (1985).
232. 295 Ark. 154, 747 S.W.2d 103 (1988).
233. Id. at 157, 747 S.W.2d at 105.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 160-61, 747 S.W.2d at 107-08.
236. The dissenters characterized the conduct of the employer in Ingram as far
more egregious than that held sufficient to establish a claim of outrage in Counce.
Id.; See supra notes 214-21 and accompanying text.
237. 268 Ark. at 269, 596 S.W.2d at 687-88.
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Lakewood Inc. ,238 in which the plaintiff sued for intentional infliction
of emotional distress based on the employer's assignment of the
employee to tasks which were almost necessarily likely to produce
injury from exposure to highly toxic chemicals used in the production
of agricultural products. A unified supreme court rejected the
contention that the employer's intentional assignment of dangerous
tasks to the employee despite the known risks constituted actionable
conduct .239
Rather, the court in White held that the employee's exclusive
remedy under Arkansas law was to apply for appropriate benefits
under the Workers' Compensation Actm for any injury ultimately
suffered. In so holding, the court distinguished the employer's actions
from those in which the employee sustains a willful assault or battery
by the employer24' or his agent, which may afford the employee an
election to seek damages for the intentional act under a theory of
constructive discharge or pursue recovery under the workers'
compensation statute. 242 Where the employer's acts fall within the
scope of his authority to make company policy and implement the
same, the poor quality of decision-making exemplified in policy does
not give rise to the cause of action for outrage. In both Ingram 2 3
and White,24 the claim of outrageous conduct essentially related to
actions, policies, or implementation which traditionally have fallen
within the autonomy accorded to employers.
These decisions strongly suggest that only where the employer's
conduct exceeds the bounds of enterprise decision-making, such as
in the false accusation of theft or failure of performance, will any
set of facts support an action for outrage. 25 The Harris court
238. 290 Ark. 421, 720 S.W.2d 702 (1986).
239. 290 Ark. at 424, 720 S.W.2d at 703. Justice Purtle, perhaps the strongest
proponent of "outrage" as a basis for liability in tort, wrote the court's opinion.
240. 290 Ark. at 423, 720 S.W.2d at 703. The majority relied on prior decisions
in Cain v. National Union Life Ins. Co., 290 Ark. 240, 719 S.W.2d 444 (1986)
and Miller v. Ensco, Inc., 286 Ark. 458, 692 S.W.2d 615 (1985), in which independent
actions for bad faith on the part of insurers refusing to pay claims in a timely
fashion were rejected, the court holding that the exclusive remedy for failure to
timely pay claims for medical expenses was that afforded by the workers' com-
pensation act. Id.
241. 290 Ark. at 423, 720 S.W.2d at 703.
242. The employee is permitted to elect to choose the assault as a severance of
the employment relationship. Id.
243. 295 Ark. 154, 747 S.W.2d 103.
244. 290 Ark. 421, 720 S.W.2d 702.
245. In Smith v. American Greetings Corp., 304 Ark. 596, 601, 804 S.W.2d
683, 686 (1991), the court noted: "We have taken a strict view in recognizing such
a claim [for outrageous conduct], especially in employment relationship situations."
Id.
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expressed the limitation on reliance on outrage in a termination
situation in the following way:
Because of the employer's right to discharge an at-will employee,
a claim of outrage by an at-will employee cannot be predicated
upon the fact of the discharge alone. However, the manner in
which the discharge is accomplished or the circumstances under
which it occurs may render the employer liable .... To be
actionable the employer's conduct must be so extreme and
outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and
be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community. 246
This formulation may afford some discharged employees a basis for
recovery on the theory of outrage. 247 However, a literal application
of the notions "beyond all possible bounds of decency" and "atrocious
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community" would require an
almost impossible burden in most cases. In fact, the conduct related
in Counce,24 8 Bone,249 and Hess v. Treece250 might hardly be said
to go "beyond all possible bounds of decency." On the contrary,
the non-actionable conduct of an employer requiring an employee
to be exposed to hazardous chemicals carrying a threat of development
of cancer might prove more difficult to justify; yet the court in
White25' found this conduct permissible, presumably because the
employee could eventually apply for workers' compensation benefits
once the cancer is diagnosed. 25 2
The difficulty in meeting the standard set for recovery and the
inconsistency in the supreme court's review of outrage cases suggest
the general problems in pursuing a remedy for wrongful discharge
246. 287 Ark. at 353, 700 S.W.2d at 43.
247. But see Sterling v. Upjohn Healthcare Servs., Inc., 299 Ark. 278, 772
S.W.2d 329 (1989) (disallowing a claim for outrage where plaintiff's supervisor
harassed him, falsely told other employees that plaintiff was habitually drunk,
accused plaintiff of making false statements on his employment application, delayed
payment on plaintiff's expense vouchers, directed other employees to watch plaintiff
and report back to him, instructed plaintiff not to communicate with other em-
ployees, and cursed plaintiff angrily in the presence of other employees).
248. M.B.M. Co., Inc. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
249. Tandy Corp. v. Bone, 283 Ark. 399, 678 S.W.2d 312 (1984).
250. Hess v. Treece, 286 Ark. 434, 693 S.W.2d 792 (1985).
251. 290 Ark. at 422, 720 S.W.2d at 703.
252. Id. One might well argue that there could be little to distinguish an employer's
behavior in deliberately exposing employees to a known cancer risk from behavior
which is "so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized com-
munity."
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based on this theory.23 However, two factors suggest that a specific
remedy in outrage might be appropriate where the discharge is
effected in retaliation for the filing of a workers' compensation
claim. First, the discriminating employer clearly is aware that the
conduct in discharging or otherwise penalizing the employee violates
state law. Second, the employer is virtually by definition aware that
the discharged or penalized employee has suffered an injury or
disability requiring medical treatment which may impair future ability
to work.
2. Filing for Workers' Compensation Benefits as a Factor
in Arguing Outrage Arising from Discharge
Where discharge is predicated on the filing of a workers'
compensation claim by an injured employee, both the situation
immediately characterizing the employee's condition and the motivation
for discharge should warrant a finding of outrageous conduct on
the part of the employer. The discharge of an employee seeking
compensation for a work-related injury distinguishes the injured
employee from other plaintiffs seeking recovery in the context of
the usual at will employment relationship. Thus, in Sterling v. Upjohn
Healthcare Services, Inc. ,254 the court rejected a claim of outrage
based on the plaintiff's harassment by a supervisor who apparently
slandered and undermined the plaintiff's working relationship. 255
Instead, the court continued to follow its policy of applying a "strict"
view of claims of outrage in employment situations, explaining,
"[t]his is because an employer must be given a certain amount of
latitude in dealing with employees. "256
The most important statement from the Arkansas Supreme Court
relevant to the use of outrage as a theory for recovery for wrongfully
terminated compensation claimants may well be found in Smith v.
American Greetings Corp.2 7 There, the court observed that "[t]he
extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from
the employer's knowledge that the employee is peculiarly susceptible
to emotional distress by reason of some physical or mental
253. For example, Justice Dudley, in dissenting from denial of Oxford's petition
for rehearing in Sterling Drug, observed that the majority opinion in the case
"clearly requires employees to suffer considerably more outrageous conduct by
employers than is required of non-employees. This is a distinction not previously
made by any court so far as I can determine. It is a result argued by no one and
sought by no one." 294 Ark. at 239, 747 S.W.2d at 579 (emphasis added).
254. 299 Ark. 278, 772 S.W.2d 329 (1989).
255. Id. at 279, 772 S.W.2d at 330.
256. Id. at 280, 772 S.W.2d at 330.
257. 304 Ark. 596, 804 S.W.2d 683 (1991).
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peculiarity. ' 258 Thus, conduct which might not constitute outrageous
behavior when an employer does not know the employee is "peculiarly
susceptible" would prove outrage if the employer did know of the
particular circumstances of the employee.2 5 9
This general rationale may explain the court's affirmance of a
directed verdict in Mechanics Lumber Co. v. Smith.2 60 The employee
alleged outrage based on the employer's requirement that he take
a polygraph examination. The employee suffered from advanced
multiple sclerosis and required medication. 26' After the initial test
results were reported as uncertain due to the employee's medication,
the test was rescheduled and the employer subsequently terminated
the plaintiff as physically unfit to work. The court held that because
there was no evidence that the employer knew or should have known
that the plaintiff would be adversely affected in the examination
results by his disease and, further, because the plaintiff admitted
that the examination itself had not exacerbated his condition, no
outrageous conduct was shown. The mere scheduling of the second
exam was not sufficient to warrant recovery. 262 Had the plaintiff
been able to allege facts showing a deliberate disregard for his health
in the requirement that he take and pass the examination, he might
have met the threshold requirement for demonstrating outrage.
In comparison, the workers' compensation claimant discharged
or penalized by the employer is subjected to retaliation at a time
when he is particularly susceptible to physical and mental distress
which either is or should be apparent to the employer. 263 At a
minimum, the employer who engages in any action following the
258. Id. at 602, 804 S.W.2d at 686.
259. Id. In Smith, however, the court rejected the claim of outrage on facts
alleged by the plaintilff which showved that histermi-nation. was the product of a
fight with a supervisor, even though the supervisor allegedly began the fight. Id.
at 602, 804 S.W.2d at 685-86.
260. 296 Ark. 285, 752 S.W.2d 763 (1988).
261. Id. at 287, 752 S.W.2d at 764.
262. Id. at 288, 752 S.W.2d at 765.
263. However, in Mertyris v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc., 310 Ark. 132, 832 S.W.2d
823 (1992), the court rejected a claim of outrage asserted by an employee who
had been terminated following an apparent work-related mental distress. The plain-
tiff, a truckdriver, had been involved in a traffic fatality and was suspended
following the filing of charges for manslaughter in Arizona. After he was acquitted
on these charges, he filed a compensation claim alleging mental distress due to the
accident and was suspended for six months by the employer. He subsequently
suffered a heart attack and then required a heart transplant and was thereafter
discharged after becoming disabled. The suspension was required by United States
Department of Transportation regulations, however, and the court found that the
employer's action did not amount to outrageous conduct. Id. at 134, 832 S.W.2d
at 826.
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filing of the compensation claim or notice that the worker has
sustained an injury claimed to be work-related is aware of the claimed
injury and the worker's option of relying on the compensation system
to seek benefits. Clearly, the discriminating employer should be aware
of the peculiar vulnerability faced by the injured worker and the
consequences of termination or other penalty.
First, the injured employee who is discharged for availing himself
of statutory remedies for compensation is already in a threatened
economic condition as a result of the injury. He has experienced
some temporary or potentially permanent loss of earning capacity
as a result of the injury and also, in all probability, some lost wages
as a result of time off of work.26 Compounding the immediate
economic consequences faced by the injured employee is the long
term loss of security once the employer terminates the injured worker's
employment.
The termination, coupled with the prior history of injury, may
well result in a further discriminatory hiring decision when the
employee seeks other employment. 265 Although this type of
discrimination is prohibited by the statute, 266 sophisticated personnel
managers could readily be expected to find rational reasons for
failing to hire the applicant whose prior history shows both a work-
related injury and termination. Difficulty in obtaining subsequent
employment obviously compounds the economic problem posed by
the initial termination.
Moreover, the termination decision" may have significant
consequences apart from the basic loss of income, such as the loss
of group medical insurance coverage for the employee and employee's
family.2 67 Once lost, this coverage is almost impossible to replace
at an affordable rate without the benefit of another group umbrella
policy which is available, if at all, only upon reemployment. Similarly,
264. Although the injured employee may be entitled to compensation, the level
of compensation afforded by computation of the weekly wage rate will generally
be lese than actual wages the employee would have earned on the job. See supra
note 190.
265. Supra notes 38 and 39.
266. Supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
267. Loss of insurance coverage and insurability appear to be elements of damages
seldom pleaded or argued by plaintiff's counsel; yet a broad reading of loss of
employment benefits would certainly encompass loss of insurance coverage. Indeed,
even the court in Sterling Drug may have opened the door to such recovery in
holding: "In addition, an employee can recover for any other tangible employment
benefit lost as a result of the termination." 294 Ark. at 251-52, 743 S.W.2d at
387. Other courts have approved submission of broad issues relating to loss of
benefits. See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 453-54 (Tex. 1981).
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the loss of other benefits, such as unvested retirement benefits and
stock participation programs, may also result from the termination, 261
as well as company-provided day care, and educational and recreational
programs formerly available to the employee in conjunction with
his employment.
Further, the terminated employee loses the benefit of seniority
earned with the employer, even if he is able to obtain other
employment. While this may have a direct impact on earnings and
benefit levels which can be calculated with some degree of precision,
the psychic consequences of termination following loyal employment
and career advancement may prove more difficult to assess. Clearly,
if the termination follows an extended period of service to the
employer, the worker may suffer considerable emotional injury from
the violation of his expectation of company support during a time
when he has already suffered a physically painful and disabling
injury, regardless of the prognosis for restoration of health or
availability of other employment.
Not only does the magnitude of loss which may be experienced
by the individual employee suggest that termination may constitute
"outrageous" conduct under the formula applied by Arkansas courts,
but the nature of the employer's conduct may also militate in favor
of a finding of outrageousness.2 69 Clearly, the decisions suggest that
consequences alone will probably not be sufficient to demonstrate
"outrageous" conduct. But when considered with the employer's
illegal motivation in terminating or otherwise discriminating against
the injured employee, the requisite showing of intent and consequence
should be sufficient to sustain an action for outrage. 270 Two factors
support this argument: first, the employer who discriminates engages
in conduct already declared illegal and contrary to the public policy
of the state;27I and, second, the dire consequences faced by the
268. The loss of this type of benefit appears subject to recovery under Sterling
Drug, since it does not contemplate a prospective or future loss.
269. In Mechanics Lumber Co. v. Smith, 296 Ark. 285, 752 S.W.2d 763 (1988),
the court held that the employer's lack of knowledge that the employee's multiple
sclerosis could be worsened by the forced taking of a polygraph examination
precluded a finding of outrageousness, while suggesting that had the employer
known that it might have aggravated the condition, outrage would have been
demonstrated. Id. at 288-89, 752 S.W.2d at 764-65.
270. In the case of an illegal discharge, the employer would not be permitted
to rely on the doctrine of employment-at-will to justify otherwise egregious conduct.
See, e.g., Sterling v. Upjohn, 299 Ark. 275, 772 S.W.2d 329 (1989).
271. A strong expression of this threshold of "outrage" was given to discharge
of workers' compensation claimants by the North Dakota court in Krein v. Marian
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employee who is terminated or discriminated against as a result of
filing for benefits for a work-related injury are clearly within the
realm of foreseeability.2 72 For example, an employer who knowingly
discriminates against a worker filing for compensation benefits also
knows that other employers are likely to do the same in considering
the worker's application for other employment. 273 The prior history
of injury, coupled with the history of filing for compensation benefits
and the subsequent discharge, 274 are sufficient to provide any employer
of a mind to discriminate with a basis for doing so in the hiring
process.
The unresolved question is whether the termination of an at
will employee based on his filing of a claim for workers' compensation
benefits-given both the illegal intent and the extreme consequences
which may reasonably be foreseen to befall the discharged employee-
will meet the standard for "outrageous" conduct set forth in Harris
v. Arkansas Book Company.275 While the Harris court suggested the
possibility that the manner of discharge or the circumstances under
which it occurs may serve to demonstrate the requisite degree of
extremity for stating a claim for outrage, 276 the court's further
expression undermines the hope initially offered. The Harris court
required that the employer's conduct meet the standard of conduct
"beyond all possible bounds of decency" and be such as to be
"regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community." This formulation might prove so stringent that only
a minority of illegally discharged employees would hope to prove
circumstances sufficiently dire as to make the employer's conduct
"utterly intolerable.' '277 Unless the standard is relaxed, the remedy
Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 794-95 (N.D. 1987):
The "sure and certain relief" for an injured workman in our Workmen's
Compensation Act would be largely illusory and do little for the workman's
"well-being" if the price were loss of his immediate livelihood. We agree
with those courts which hold that discharge of an employee for seeking
workmen's compensation profanes public policy and permits a tort action
against the employer.
Id. at 794.
272. See supra notes 184-197 and accompanying text.
273. The employer may affirmatively seek to block other employment by reporting
to subsequent employers investigating an application for employment the fact that
the discharged employee has been injured, has filed a workers' compensation claim
or pursued other remedies as a result of the discharge. See VanTran Electric Corp.
v. Thomas, supra note 178.
274. See Douglas v. Levingston Shipbldg., 617 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979)
and Swanson v. American Mfg. Co., 511 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
275. 287 Ark. 353, 700 S.W.2d 41.
276. 287 Ark. at 356, 700 S.W.2d at 43.
277. See, e.g., Justice Dudley's dissent in Ingram v. Pirelli Cable Corp., supra
notes 231-232 and accompanying text.
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for outrage will prove so uncertain that it will afford no real prospect
for either deterring employer violations278  or fully compensating
meritorious claims for any but the most extreme cases. 2 9
The remedy based on "outrage" unfortunately fails to offer a
sufficiently certain prospect for recovery at this stage in the
development of Arkansas law to be effective. Plaintiffs' counsel
evaluating the likelihood of recovery on this theory are justifiably
inclined to view this remedy with suspicion because of the extremely
high threshold for proof of "outrageous" conduct in this particular
context. Until further refinements in the theory underlying this remedy
can be made by Arkansas appellate courts, 280 its promise is severely
compromised by the practical reality that few decisions have actually
affirmed that conduct demonstrated at trial or alleged in the plaintiff's
pleadings was sufficient to meet the test repeated by the Harris
court.
Perhaps the best hope for aggrieved compensation claimants lies
in the General Assembly's action in "annulling" the post-Sterling
Drug decisions extending that holding to compensation claimants.
As a consequence of denying the judicially created remedy to a
single class of wrongfully terminated employees, the courts might
see expansion of the doctrine of outrage as appropriate to afford
these claimants a remedy in the form of civil litigation, rather than
restricting their rights to the criminal and administrative liability
imposed by Act 796.28 1
B. Independent Action for Intentional Tort
An alternative to the action for outrageous conduct lies in an
intentional tort theory recognized by the Arkansas Supreme Court
in Midwest Buslines, Inc. v. Johnson.28 2 This decision is particularly
signifiennt fnr twn rennn - firqt. it was issued in !907. suggesting
that it represents continuing support among the membership of the
court 283 at a time when the outrage theory was being held inapplicable
278. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 244-50 and accompanying text.
280. The alternative to a judicial expansion of the theory of "outrage" would
be, of course, legislative adoption of a remedy for wrongful discharge. Such a
remedy is currently in the proposal stage with the creation of a model act governing
employment rights. For a discussion of the ALI Model Employment Termination
Act, see Randall Samborn, At-Will Doctrine Under Fire: Model Act Divides Em-
ployment Bar, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 1991, at 1.
281. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107(a), (c) (Michie Supp. 1993).
282. 291 Ark. 304, 724 S.W.2d 453 (1987).
283. In fact, the decision authored by Justice Glaze was unanimous, in contrast
[Vol. 16:373
WORKERS COMPENSATION
to the actions of the employer in Sterling Drug; and second, because
the opinion expressly rejects the notion that outrage is the only
theory upon which an intentional tort action predicated on mental
anguish damages may be brought in Arkansas.2 84
The Midwest Buslines decision, which involved a relatively
insignificant sum in terms of damages, arose from the action of a
company driver in ejecting an elderly passenger who was attempting
to return to his home after a hospitalization in Little Rock for
gastrointestinal bleeding and alcoholic hepatitis. The driver had been
forewarned to expect the plaintiff as a passenger, but was apparently
unprepared for the elderly man's incontinence which resulted either
in his urinating in his pants or in a paper cup in the aisle of the
bus. 2 5 The plaintiff testified that he had been unable to get to the
restroom at the back of the bus because of people in his way in
the aisle. The driver ejected the passenger, but whether he did so
at a station or on the side of the road was in dispute in the testimony
at trial. 26 Nevertheless, the jury apparently believed the ejection
improper and awarded damages to the plaintiff.
On appeal, the bus company argued that in the absence of a
showing of physical injury resulting from the ejection, the passenger
could not recover merely for mental anguish without pleading and
proving that the driver's conduct was "outrageous." However, the
court rejected this line of argument with the terse explanation: "Based
upon the facts of this case, we do not believe appellee was limited
to such a theory. '2 7
The court's expression does not clarify which facts warrant a
non-outrage cause of action for an intentional tort in this case. As
the outrage decisions demonstrate, the passenger's claim might well
not have risen to the level of conduct required to show that the
driver's behavior would have qualified under Arkanas law. Moreover,
in contrast to the typical outrage case, in Midwest Buslines the facts
demonstrate the absence of the type of relationship between the
to the fragmentation of the court in Sterling Drug, in which Justices Hays, Purtle,
and Hickman dissented, 249 Ark. at 253, 743 S.W.2d at 387, Baysinger, in which
Justices Brown and Hays, joined by Special Justice Epley, dissented, 304 Ark. at
249-56, 812 S.W.2d at 469-72, and Mapco, Inc., in which Justices Hays and Brown
dissented, 304 Ark. at 202, 812 S.W.2d at 486. Justice Brown's dissenting opinions,
however, focus on sufficiency of the evidence offered to prove discriminatory intent,
rather than disagreement with the concept of recognition of a civil remedy reflecting
Arkansas public policy.
284. 291 Ark. at 305, 724 S.W.2d at 454 n.l.
285. 291 Ark. at 306-07, 724 S.W.2d at 454-55.
286. Id.
287. 291 Ark. at 305, 724 S.W.2d at 454 n.1.
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actors which suggests that the offender knew or should have known
the extreme nature of his conduct and its probable impact upon his
' 'victim. '
The court may have seized upon the traditional role of the
common carrier as protector of the passenger, which has often given
rise to a higher standard of care, 288 in concluding that the facts in
Midwest Buslines supported an intentional tort action not grounded
in the law of outrage. 289 If this rationale explains the decision, then
prospective litigants may well be limited to relying on this theory
only in common carrier or perhaps accommodations situations. In
contrast, the common law tradition of "at will" employment, arising
along with the notion of the common carrier's greater duty toward
passengers, would suggest that the improperly discharged employee
would have no new cause of action following Midwest Buslines.
One indication of the court's thinking in Midwest Buslines may
lie in its reliance on the 1940 decision in Arkansas Motor Coaches
v. Whitlock,290 another case involving an ejection of a passenger
from a common carrier. There, the court upheld compensation for
mental anguish based on an actual or constructive physical injury
which followed an improper use of force. Assuming that the injury
occurred when the passenger was forcibly removed from the bus,
the court concluded that once the passenger demonstrated a physical
ejection, recovery for mental anguish could properly follow. 29'
The forced -eviction of the plaintiff in Midwest Buslines from
the vehicle, apparently unjustified on the facts, followed the factual
pattern previously recognized as giving rise to a cause of action for
infliction of emotional distress in Whitlock. Thus, the court may
simply have recognized a similar right or cause of action for passengers
improperly evicted from public transportation based on the parallel
fact patterns in the two cases, avoiding the necessity for either
overruling or distinguishing the prior decision. Alternatively, the
court may have affirmed a cause of action distinctively emanating
from the public transportation aspect of the case, carrying forward
common law principles of duties owed to passengers of common
288. Home Ins. Co. v. Covington, 255 Ark. 409, 501 S.W.2d 219 (1973) (holding
"common carrier" ambulance company owed high standard of care to passenger).
289. Even if the agent of a common carrier has a legal right to eject a passenger,
a known disability of the passenger requires the agent to do so without causing
the passenger to be endangered. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Dallas, 93 Ark. 209,
124 S.W. 247 (1910); St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Woodruff, 89 Ark. 9, 115
S.W. 953 (1909).
290. 199 Ark. 820, 136 S.W.2d 184 (1940).
291. Id. at 825, 136 S.W.2d at 187.
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,carriers. However, in Midwest Buslines the court never explained its
reasoning in these terms, suggesting that an alternative theory of
the action might be explored in the employment context.
Arguably, the court might move to distinguish cases of outrage
from those requiring a lesser showing of extreme conduct on the
part of the actor based upon the peculiar relationship of the parties.
Just as the bus driver owes the passenger a duty arising from their
particular relationship, the employer might be said to owe a similar
duty to the employee. This notion of duty recognizes that the on-
going relationship of the two parties requires them to act with greater
care, or fairness, than is required of parties who do not share any
relationship or experience prior to the conduct giving rise to the
action in tort. Thus, outrage would be a theory for recovery limited
to extreme conduct arising from any set of circumstances, whereas
the prior relationship of the parties might render less extreme conduct
actionable in a more limited set of circumstances.
Applying this approach to the tort clearly recognized by the
supreme court in Midwest Buslines and Whitlock, the court could
conclude that conduct not rising to the extreme level necessary for
establishing a cause of action for outrage is nevertheless actionable
when it occurs in the context of a pre-existing relationship or
experience. This would be particularly applicable where the offending
party could be said to stand in a position of power or control over
the offended party, such that other forms of response would not
be available. Thus, extreme conduct by one businessman toward
another might not prove actionable despite a long history of business
transactions between the two, while similar conduct directed at an
employee would prove actionable.
The option afforded counsel in the retaliatory discharge case
by Midwest Buslines might be to plead an alternative theory to
outrage and contract where the employer's discriminatory action
clearly violates the public policy set forth in Section 11-9-107 of the
Arkansas Code. This approach may offer significant strategic
advantages to the plaintiff's counsel in both negotiating and trying
the case. A trial judge hostile to the theory of outrage, or simply
confused by the case law generated by Arkansas courts to date, may
well grant summary judgment or directed verdict against a plaintiff
who presents even a compelling claim of discriminatory intent and
action on the part of an employer responding to the plaintiff's claim
for workers' compensation benefits. The availability of alternative
theories for the action, predicated either on the expanded notion of
statutory negligence or following the Midwest Buslines approach,
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serves to afford counsel additional lines of argument for appeal in
the event the entire case is disposed of summarily. In the event that
the court takes only the outrage claim from the jury, the availability
of the alternative theories will permit the case to go forward and
possibly result in a jury verdict rendering the trial court's action on
the outrage claim moot.
Counsel representing the discharged workers' compensation
claimant should be prepared to explore tort theories for recovery
despite the Arkansas Supreme Court's apparent rejection of outrage
as a basis for this type of claim by the decision in Sterling Drug.
Certainly, the court did not preclude an action in tort for a wrongful
firing, it simply rejected the outrage theory on the facts presented.
Because the circumstances of the fired whistle-blower and discharged
injured employee differ dramatically, the tort remedy may be peculiarly
applicable to the claim brought by the latter. In fact, Sterling Drug
might well be read less as a case focusing on remedy, and more as
the opening round of discussion of the public policy exception to
the tradition of employment-at-will.
IV. PROBLEMS OF PROOF IN RETALIATORY DISCHARGE CLAIMS
A central problem of proof of retaliatory intent in the discharge
of an employee who has filed for workers' compensation benefits
lies in the difficulty in establishing the intent factor through direct
evidence. This problem is common to proof of claims brought in
a civil action, 292 in a criminal prosecution, or in an administrative
proceeding, although differing standards of proof govern civil and
criminal proceedings .293
Typically, an employer is not so foolish as to document an
illegal or retaliatory motive for discharge. 294 However, that may not
292. For example, the circumstantial evidence held sufficient to support a jury
verdict by the majority in Mapco, Inc. was characterized as "highly speculative"
by Justice Brown in his dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Hays. 306
Ark. at 202-04, 812 S.W.2d at 486-87.
293. For an interesting analysis of one way in which a discharged employee
might meet the burden of proving retaliatory intent by a preponderance of the
evidence, the standard applicable in a civil action, see Moore v. McDermott, Inc.,
494 So. 2d 1159 (La. 1986).
294. The Mapco, Inc. majority noted the typical need to prove discriminatory
intent circumtantially, relying on 2A ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 68.36(c) (1990). 306 Ark. 201, 812 S.W.2d at 485. Occasionally,
an employer may admit that the termination is based on the employee's action in
filing for compensation benefits. See Wiley v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 430 So. 2d 1016
(La. Ct. App. 1982).
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necessarily be the case given the lack of apparent history of litigation
of this type of claim either in a civil action or in terms of a criminal
prosecution under former Section 11-9-107.29 Nevertheless, in the
absence of direct evidence of the employer's intent, the plaintiff in
the wrongful discharge action has two difficult burdens to overcome.
First, it is essential that the employee establish through circumstantial
evidence, if necessary, 296 that a discriminatory or retaliatory motive
existed for his discharge. Second, the employee must be prepared
to combat an alternative explanation advanced by the employer for
the termination once the employer's action is challenged through
litigation.
The most important legal complication in the proof of the claim
may not result from the burden of proving the first proposition,
but in disproving the existence of a justified motivation for ter-
mination which may coexist with the improper motivation and have
prompted the firing. Because the opinion in Sterling Drug did not
address the problem of "sole cause," as opposed to "contributing
cause," in defining the burden of proof in the wrongful discharge
action, there is no clear expression of Arkansas law guiding dis-
position of this issue. 297
If the question is resolved in terms of requiring the employee
to prove that retaliation was the "sole cause" for his termination,
prospects of either recovery in the individual case or deterrence
generally are dimmed considerably. 29 The employer faced with the
295. The annotations included in the 1987 codification of the Arkansas Code
do not include a single reference to a criminal prosecution brought pursuant to
former Section 11-9-107. The absence of annotations does not conclusively prove
that no prosecutions were undertaken, of course, but it does indicate that no
appellate opinions were eventually issued in cases brought pursuant to the statute.
296. In his dissent in Mapco, Inc., Justice Brown observed: "Admittedly, pro-
viding motive and intent in these cases is difficult. Yet, something more must be
shown in the way of circumstantial evidence beyond the mere filing of a workers'
compensation claim and a subsequent refusal to rehire." 306 Ark. at 203, 812
S.W.2d at 486 (Brown, J., dissenting).
297. In framing the question in Mapco, Inc., the court concluded that the prima
facie case can be established by demonstrating that the employee's reliance on the
statutorily created workers' compensation remedy "was a cause for the retaliation."
306 Ark. at 201, 812 S.W.2d at 485 (emphasis added). Whether the use of the
article "a" instead of "the" is of consequence is an issue that has been displaced,
at least temporarily, by the legislative action in adoption of Act 796 and the
purported effect of its section 6 in abrogating the judicially-recognized civil remedy
for wrongful discharge. See Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557, 559-60
(Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting the argument that a discharged employee must
prove filing for compensation benefits was the "sole cause" for discharge); accord,
Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 720 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 734
S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1987).
298. Other jurisdictions confronting the "sole cause" issue have concluded that
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need to produce an alternative explanation for the discharge after
the filing of a formal complaint may be able to fashion a reason,
whether truthful or not, from deficient employee performance, 29
history of friction with other employees, 300 insubordination, or con-
cern that the injury will render the employee unfit for performance
of his usual duties in the future. 01 Once the employer offers an
alternative explanation, the employee will be faced with disproving
this rationale for the termination. 0 2 This is a difficult task unless
the personnel file or other record of employment clearly refutes the
employer's after-the-fact explanation of his motivation in discharging
the claimant following the filing of a claim for workers' compensation
benefits.
A requirement that the termination have been motivated in part,
if not wholly, by the employer's desire to retaliate against the
employee for his action in pursuing workers' compensation benefits
affords the employee certain obvious benefits. First, it results in a
greater likelihood that the employee in the individual instance would
be able to recover for the loss sustained. Second, the reliance on
a "contributing," rather than a "sole cause," burden would enhance
the credibility of the deterrent offered by the administrative sanction
imposed by Act 796.303 Adoption of this contributing cause, as
opposed to a sole cause, approach would be consistent with rec-
ognition of the remedy in any event, because it is the improper
motivation of the employer that gives rise to the cause of action.
Thus, irrespective of the employer's other reasons for termination-
proof of discriminatory intent as a cause, rather than the sole cause for discharge
or other adverse job action, is all that the aggrieved worker must demonstrate.
See Buckner v. General Motors Corp., 760 P.2d 803 (Okla. 1988) (requiring proof
that discriminatory intent was a "significant factor" in the termination decision);
Sate, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981)
299. See Mapco Inc., 306 Ark. at 201, 812 S.W.2d at 486 (Brown, J., dissenting);
VanTran Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 708 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
300. Or, as in E-Tex Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Adair, 566 S.W.2d 37, 40 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1978), evidence showing misconduct on the part of the plaintiff with a female
co-employee was held insufficient to show that discharge occurred solely as a result
of this misconduct, even though the employer's assertion appeared to be supported
by the record. Here, the use of a "sole cause" instruction would have likely resulted
in no recovery.
301. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239, 246, 812 S.W.2d 463,
467 (Ark. 1991); Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Tex. 1980).
302. The Arkansas approach to the burden of proof contemplates that once a
prima facie case of discrimination is shown the burden shifts to the employer to
show a justifiable ground for termination. Baysinger, 306 Ark. at 246, 812 S.W.2d
at 467 (citing 2A ARTms LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 68.36(c)
(1990)). The opinion is silent on the "sole cause" issue.
303. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107(a) (Michie Supp. 1993).
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which, consistent with the doctrine of at-will employment, might
include no reason at all-the existence of a retaliatory motive con-
travening the intent of Section 11-9-107 would still afford the dis-
charged employee grounds for recovery.
The legislative action in amending Section 11-9-107 does not
demonstrate any intent to require proof that discriminatory intent
was the sole cause of the adverse employment action in order to
bring the employer's action within the prohibition of Section 6 of
Act 796. Moreover, the sole cause approach, when applied in other
contexts under the workers' compensation law, traditionally operated
to protect the employee, rather than the employer. For example, an
injury resulting from the employee's voluntary intoxication would
be compensable unless the intoxication could be shown to be the
sole cause of the injury.3° Act 796 now creates a presumption that
injuries sustained while intoxicated are not compensable, although
the presumption is rebuttable and couches the exclusion in terms of
"substantial," rather than sole, cause 5.30 Arguably, had the legislature
intended to restrict liability to situations in which discriminatory
intent was the sole cause of the employer's illegal action, it would
have expressly provided for this standard of proof in Section 6.
Section 6 did not do so. One reasonable inference is that the purpose
of the provision is to punish discrimination in any event, whether
reflected as the sole cause or "a" cause of the employer's action.3c0
304. Elm Springs Canning Co. v. Sullins, 207 Ark. 257, 180 S.W.2d 113 (1944).
305. Section 2 of Act 796 provides, in pertinent part, that certain injuries are
not compensable, including:
(iv) Injury where the accident was substantially occasioned by the use
of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of
a physician's orders. The presence of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription
drugs used in contravention of a physician's orders shall create a rebuttable
presumption that the injury or accident was substantially occasioned by
the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention
of physician's orders; every employee is deemed by his performance of
services to have impliedly consented to reasonable and responsible testing
by properly trained medical or law enforcement personnel for the presence
of any of the aforementioned substances in the employee's body; an
employee shall not be entitled to compensation unless it is proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the alcohol, illegal drugs or prescription
drugs utilized in contravention of the physician's orders did not substantially
occasion the injury or accident.
1993 Ark. Acts 796, § 2 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 1l-9-102(5)(A)(iv) (Michie
Supp. 1993)).
306. Alternatively, of course, it might also be inferred that the legislature merely
retained Section 11-9-107 as a gesture to labor, and the lack of concern about the
burden or standard of proof accurately reflects the legislature's perception that
employers will not be threatened either administratively or criminally when they
commit illegal discriminatory acts against compensation claimants.
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Clearly, counsel for the plaintiff in a tort action should be prepared
to submit an instruction setting forth a "contributing cause" theory
for the termination while counsel for the employer will want to
protect his client's interest by submitting a sole cause instruction.
Defense counsel may also need to explore the possibility of
developing a defense predicated on the employee's lack of good
faith in filing for workers' compensation benefits.3 7 If the employee
has submitted a fraudulent claim of injury, or the employer has a
reasonable basis for believing that the claim of injury is not made
in good faith, discharge may be proper because it results not from
the employee's attempt to exercise his rights under the workers'
compensation statute, but rather from his attempt to prosecute a
false claim. If the defense is developed and supported by testimony
or other evidence at trial, defense counsel should pursue one of two
options. First, counsel might pursue a defensive theory setting forth
the principle that the employer's discretion to fire based on employee
fraud is protected. Second, counsel might request an instruction
requiring the plaintiff to prove that his claim for compensation has
been made in good faith as a prerequisite for a jury finding of
liability for illegal motivation for his termination. The latter is the
preferable form.
The problem posed by the sole cause/contributing cause issue
and the likelihood that the employee's proof will be largely circum-
stantial prompts two other concerns. First, in a civil action the
employee should seek an instruction which incorporates a presump-
tion that an employer's action in terminating an employee within
a short period of time following the report of injury, filing of the
workers' compensation claim, or resolution of the claim through
the administrative process will support the conclusion that the em-
ployer has acted in retaliation for the employee's efforts at securing
workers' compensation benefits. The presumption will be subject to
rebuttal, of course, but this approach would ensure that the employer
who does have a good faith explanation for termination will be
required to go forward and offer this explantion for the jury's
consideration.
Second, the framework provided for proof of the claim and
defense in Wal-Mart v. Baysinger serves to facilitate development
of both the plaintiff's theory of the case and the employer's de-
307. E.g., Elzey v. Forrest, 739 P.2d 999 (Okla. 1987) (holding statutory action
for retaliation protects only employees who file claims in good faith).
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fense.3°s From the empoyee's standpoint, the development of the
prima facie case of discrimination in the discharge should serve to
shift the burden to the employer to go forward with his explanation
for the termination. 3°9 This would permit the jury to consider all
the relevant evidence in evaluating the plaintiff's claim in a case
which relies largely on either circumstantial evidence or the plaintiff's
personal, and probably uncorroborated, testimony relating to the
employer's retaliatory intent in terminating the employment rela-
tionship. Failure of the employer to offer an acceptable alternative
explanation would result in a plaintiff's verdict unless the jury simply
found his testimony incredible or was unpersuaded by the available
circumstantial evidence. The question unanswered by the court in
Baysinger is how the jury is to be properly instructed for consid-
eration of the employer's explanation in the event it finds the
plaintiff's proof of discrimination credible. 310
Certainly, the problems of proving retaliatory motive for the
discharge of a workers' compensation claimant will require judicial
consideration in formulating and refining a proper remedy. Nev-
ertheless, it is critical for counsel representing the discharged em-
ployee, particularly when the termination occurs during the course
of an ongoing workers' compensation proceeding, to fully explore
the remedy available for the discharged. employee. This may require
embarking on novel litigation, especially if the employee has difficulty
in obtaining other employment, or if the nature of his injury is
such as to limit alternative employment opportunities.
The most significant feature of the wrongful discharge action
for employers may not lie in the short-term problem of dealing with
restrictions on the doctrine of at-will employment. Rather, it may
result from impairment of the ability to replace employees who
suffer injury which will preclude their return to the normal per-
formance of job duties. Because any termination of a workers'
compensation claimant may suggest a retaliatory motive, the employer
308. 306 Ark. at 246, 812 S.W.2d at 467.
309. Id.
310. Id. "The court did not instruct the jury on the employer's burden to prove
a legitimate reason for the discharge, and no such instruction was requested by
either party. The evidence offered to support Appellant's reason for terminating
Appellee was not convincing." Id. Nevertheless, one might have hoped the court
would have included a more detailed explanation of the proper allocation of the
burden and provided a sample instruction and verdict form for use in future
litigation, as did the Texas appellate court in Santex. 618 S.W.2d at 558-60.
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may ultimately feel compelled to retain an employee who cannot
return to work in order to avoid defending an action for wrongful
discharge. However, a determination that the employee suffers such
residual disability as to render him unfit to return to the job should
serve to insulate the employer against an unwarranted recovery. If
the employer has acted to terminate the employment prior to such
a determination, the employee might well sustain a claim of retal-
iation. This problem is not easily resolved within the framework of
traditional workers' compensation practice because an employer typ-
ically has a right to replace an employee whose injury leaves the
enterprise understaffed. Every work-related injury carries with it the
possibility that the employee will be unable to return to the duties
typically performed on the job, though the possibility may be slight.
Given this situation, termination of the employment relationship
prior to the making of a medical determination of residual disability
may serve to suggest that the employer's true motive is retaliation,
rather than the need to fill the position. An employer may be unfairly
compromised in the efficient management of the enterprise, however,
when the recovery period itself creates a production gap due to
inability to simply substitute a temporary worker for the injured
compensation claimant.
The employer's need to replace injured employees, whether on
a temporary or permanent basis, complicates the remedy which should
be available for the worker terminated as a result of the filing for
workers' compensation benefits. It may be that no general rules can
be prescribed for such situations which will not ultimately require
that individual claims of retaliation be resolved on a case-by-case
basis. Unfortunately, deferral either to the employee in his right to
assert claims arising under the Workers' Compensation Act or to
the employer, who has traditionally been afforded the freedom to
replace empoyees a-, an aspect of the doctrine of at-will employment,
inherently will carry with it the prospect for injustice in the individual
case. Given the disparity between the resources of the typical em-
ployer and the typical injured employee, and the public policy fa-
voring the protection of workers who assert claims for workers'
compensation benefits, that policy would best be served in a general
sense by limiting employer autonomy at least until a showing of
medical disability would support permanent replacement of the em-
ployee.
V. THE OPTIONS FOR AGGRIEVED CLAIMANTS AFTER ACT 796
The need for a remedy tailored for the particular violation
experienced by an injured worker whose claim for compensation
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results in discharge or other discriminatory action would appear
certain. The statutory right is set forth in the workers' compensation
law which both provides the opportunity for the employee to seek
benefits and expressly precludes action by the employer that infringes
on the employee's right to seek those benefits.
The Sterling Drug court sought to harmonize the doctrines of
at-will employment and wrongful discharge by relying on the theory
of "implied contract." This approach, while no doubt authoritative
because of the court's preeminence in matters of Arkansas law, is
nevertheless wrought with internal inconsistency. By implying the
existence of a contract where none exists, the court has irreparably
undermined the essential notion of at-will employment. Because of
the numerous expressions of public policy found in statutory law
today, including the vast range of anti-discrimination legislation, it
is virtually impossible to suggest that true at-will employment remains
a viable approach to labor/management relationships. Nevertheless,
the General Assembly clearly intended to reaffirm support for the
judicially-created doctrine of at-will employment in its revision of
Section 11-9-107. 31
Interestingly, the General Assembly affirmed judicial doctrine
in declaring its continuing support of the at-will employment concept,
even while it disparaged judicial creativity in the recognition of the
limited civil remedy for retaliatory discharge of compensation claim-
ants. The question posed for claimants and their counsel is whether
Act 796 is subject either to direct challenge or finesse and, if so,
how to proceed.
The most obvious approach for a claimant suffering discrimi-
natory treatment by the employer is compliance with the legislative
directive in seeking redress under the revised provisions of Section
11-9-107. This means that the claimant can either actively pursue
the administrative remedy of a fine or seek criminal prosecution
through the local prosecutor's office. In either event, the claimant
stands little likelihood of an actual financial recovery to the degree
that damages would be recoverable in a civil action.
Alternatively, counsel should consider filing a civil action and
litigating the issue of constitutionality of the restriction of civil
remedies mandated by the General Assembly in its restructuring of
the state's workers' compensation law in Act 796. Defense counsel
311. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107(d) (Michie Supp. 1993) provides, "This section
shall not be construed as establishing an exception to the employment at will
doctrine."
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would likely file either a motion to dismiss the civil action or a
motion for summary judgment in reliance on the Act if a Sterling
Drug or tort action were brought. Under either scenario, the issue
is likely to reach the Arkansas Supreme Court on grant of summary
judgment in favor of the employer, preserving the constitutional
issue for direct review by the court. Because a sound constitutional
argument may be made that restriction of claimant remedies in the
fashion dictated by Act 796 represents an unauthorized exercise of
legislative power, plaintiff's counsel should at least attempt to chal-
lenge the Act before proceeding to recommend compliance with the
Act's restrictive remedy provisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Workers who suffer job-related injuries, like other at-will em-
ployees who assert statutory rights or act in the public interest,
deserve protection from employer retaliation when they file for
workers' compensation benefits. Unfortunately, employers experience
considerable pressure from rising workers' compensation insurance
premiums. Employers believe that termination of employment for
workers' compensation claimants will ultimately serve to control,
though probably not reduce, premiums paid for compensation in-
surance. Absent strict regulation of insurance premium rates to ensure
that individual employers are not compromised in their ability to
compete in the market place by the effect of rising insurance costs,
individual employers should be deterred from using discharge as a
threat to induce workers not to apply for statutorily created benefits
when injured. The most significant deterrent is the threat of civil
action to compensate an employee who is terminated for making
application for benefits.
The remedy recognized by the Arkansas Supreme Court in
Sterling Drug failed to provide an effective deterrent to employer
retaliation or adequate compensation for injured workers terminated
as a result of their filing for workers' compensation benefits. The
decision does represent an important breach in the doctrine of
employment-at-will as a matter of state law. The remedy fashioned
by the court in Sterling Drug may represent a compromise reflecting
both concern for arbitrary retaliatory action taken by employers and
fear that recognition of a broader, perhaps more attractive, remedy
will lead to a groundswell of claims that discharges have violated
public policy.
Nevertheless, the General Assembly concluded in adopting Act
796 that even the modest remedy afforded injured employees under
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Sterling Drug was the product of improper judicial innovation in
the field of workers' compensation. Consequently, the legislative
response, including an attempt to regulate the employment rela-
tionship beyond any fair reading of the grant of authority to the
legislature by the voters, seeks to restrict reliance on judicially created
civil remedies designed to modify a judicially created doctrine of
employment law.
With respect to Arkansas workers, it is clear that the public
policy of the state demands that they be afforded ready access to
benefits under the state's system of workers' compensation. Even
the clear intent of Section 6 of the Act expresses this policy, yet
the remedy then afforded under the statute offers little realistic hope
of enforcement.
The developing law of wrongful discharge, given a significant
boost in Arkansas by the decision in Sterling Drug, offers the prospect
of some level of protection for workers' compensation claimants
suffering discrimination, as the decisions in Wal-Mart v. Baysinger
and Mapco, Inc. v. Payne clearly indicate. Whether the courts will
again recognize the need for a remedy broader than that afforded
by the provisions of Section 6 to protect workers' compensation
claimants from retaliation at the hands of employers traditionally
insulated by the doctrine of "at will" employment will depend, as
in all developing areas of law, on the skill of counsel in focusing
attention on issues critical to addressing the problems of injured
workers.
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